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Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing
State Budget Crises†
BRIAN GALLE* & KIRK J. STARK**
More than two years after the official end of the Great Recession, state
governments still face significant budget deficits that cannot be addressed without
further drastic spending cuts or substantial revenue increases. The structural
origins of the ongoing state fiscal crisis are well known. Excessively procyclical
revenue structures, combined with spending obligations that increase with
economic downturns, have resulted in a budget dynamic for the states that is not
sustainable over the long term. The consensus solution to this problem is for states
to save money during boom times (via budget stabilization or “rainy day” funds)
and to draw on those savings during recessions. Unfortunately, numerous studies
have shown that states do not save anywhere close to an adequate amount for this
to be an effective strategy. As a result, during each of the past several downturns,
states have turned to the federal government for fiscal assistance—often derisively
termed “bailouts”—to address fiscal imbalances. Yet these bailouts have their own
problems, including creating an incentive for states not to establish adequate rainy
day funds, which in turn increases the likelihood of future bailout demands.
To escape from this vicious cycle, we propose a set of federal policy reforms to
facilitate state savings. We offer a menu of policy options, rather than a single
solution, because we argue that existing evidence does not clearly explain why
states do not save. Therefore, we first analyze the possible sources of failure and
then tailor a number of remedies for each; in nearly all cases, it is clear that states
would be unable to overcome the problem on their own, making federal
intervention particularly apt.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the end of the Great Recession more than two years ago, many state
governments continue to face significant funding gaps.1 Legislatures across the
country have cut programs and services, while also raising taxes, in an effort to
satisfy state constitutional balanced-budget requirements.2 These actions grow out
of an understandable instinct to make do with less, yet they intensify recessionary
pressures on households and businesses, jeopardizing economic recovery and,
paradoxically, exacerbating state budget problems.3 Worse still, current research
has shown that state budget cuts during recessions tend to be steepest in social
safety-net programs, with the result that households most affected by the economic
downturn (that is , low- and moderate-income households) are hardest hit by state
responses to budget shortfalls.4 In this Article, we propose and compare possible
federal interventions to disrupt these dynamics and prevent states from contributing
to future economic downturns.
The cycle of recession-reinforcing budget crises is a recurring phenomenon in
recent U.S. history.5 As we have explained in earlier work, state fiscal difficulties
arise chiefly from structural changes in the composition of state tax bases and the
nature of state expenditure obligations.6 State tax revenues are strongly
procyclical—receipts vary with changes in the underlying economy, exhibiting
swings from peak to trough more severe than would be expected from a tax system
that merely tracked economic activity.7 The result is a rollercoaster pattern of tax

1. Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff, & Erica Williams, An Update on State Budget Cuts: At
Least 46 States Have Imposed Cuts That Hurt Vulnerable Residents and Cause Job Loss,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1–2 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-1308sfp.pdf.
2. See Monica Davey, Budget Worries Push Governors to Same Mind-Set, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2011, at A1.
3. See Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, Fiscal Decentralization and the Business
Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 22 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2010)
(demonstrating self-reinforcing effect of recessions and subnational budgets).
4. See David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2614–40
(2005).
5. Id. at 2611–14; Bob Zahradnik & Nick Johnson, State Rainy Day Funds: What to
Do When it Rains?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 7 (Jan. 31, 2002),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1539.
6. Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 195–205 (2010);
Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 419–23 (2010).
7. See Timothy Schiller, Riding the Revenue Roller Coaster: Recent Trends in State
Government Finance, BUS. REV., First Quarter 2010, at 23, 23–30 (2010),
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2010/q1/
brq110_revenue-roller-coaster.pdf.
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receipts that is notoriously susceptible to fiscal mismanagement. State and local
spending also responds to the business cycle, with demands on social insurance
programs in particular rising during economic downturns. The problem is easy to
describe—the demand for public services goes up as revenues go down—but
difficult to resolve. Private actors typically manage a divergence between receipts
and expenditures through borrowing, saving, or some combination. Unfortunately,
state and local governments face significant limitations on both fronts.
As for borrowing, the ability of state residents to migrate to other jurisdictions
limits the extent to which states can borrow against future resources. Unlike the
federal government, state and local governments must be attentive to the risks of
eroding their tax bases through the outmigration of taxpayers averse to excessive
debt levels. This concern is especially acute with regard to the wealthiest taxpayers,
who are both the most readily mobile segment of the population and the most likely
to bear the burden of future debt repayment obligations. Even if taxpayer exit were
not a constraint, most states are limited in their capacity to borrow because of
constitutional limitations adopted out of fear of excessive debt.8 These limitations
were enacted in part out of a concern that voters or officials could be presentbiased—that is, they may weigh the benefits of spending today more heavily than
the cost of repaying tomorrow. Voters may be present biased either because they
expect to move somewhere else before the bill comes due or because of a general
psychological tendency to underestimate future costs. Officials are people too, and
so could be subject to a similar psychological bias; they may also rationally expect
that they will be out of office before the burden of debt repayment materializes. In
recognition of the risks of excessive borrowing, most states have constitutional
limitations on state indebtedness as well as some form of balanced-budget
requirement.
The most obvious strategy when faced with a need to smooth consumption in
the face of borrowing constraints is to save when times are good. Indeed, the
consensus solution advanced by most experts in the field of state and local public
finance is for states to set aside additional revenues during periods of strong
economic growth, thus obviating the need to borrow when revenues decline. In
practice, however, this strategy has proved exceptionally difficult to implement.9
States face difficulty saving for the same reason they might be inclined to borrow
excessively: savings means giving up benefits today in order to reduce the pain of
tomorrow. Even if some officials do manage to put money aside in budget
stabilization (“rainy day”) funds, future officials may raid the funds for their own
purposes. Fearing such an outcome, boom-year lawmakers understandably develop

8. Galle & Klick, supra note 6 at 200–04. For a fuller explanation of the points in this
paragraph, see infra notes 7–51.
9. Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in
Easing State Fiscal Crises During the 1990–1991 Recession, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 28, 33
(1996); Super, supra note 4, at 2611; Christian Gonzalez & Arik Levinson, State Rainy Day
Funds and the State Budget Crisis of 2002-?, ST. TAX NOTES, Aug. 11, 2003, at 441, 444;
see Justin Marlowe, Fiscal Slack and Counter-Cyclical Expenditure Stabilization: A First
Look at the Local Level, 25 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 48, 50 (2005); see also Christian Y.
Gonzalez & Vicente B. Paqueo, Social Sector Expenditures and Rainy-Day Funds 6 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3131, 2003).
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a “use it or lose it” mentality, reasoning that, if future actors are unlikely to use
savings wisely, why save at all? Confirming these effects, empirical studies have
shown existing rainy day funds to be inadequate to the task of sheltering state
budgets from recessionary revenue declines.10
The inability of states to smooth expenditures over the business cycle has
implications beyond sound fiscal housekeeping. Ultimately, the pathologies of state
budgeting imperil the project of federalism itself. State budget crises prompt
demands for federal bailouts, as evidenced in the most recent federal stimulus
package.11 Federal bailouts answer a short-term problem of how to maintain
spending levels in a fiscal crunch, but they also risk undermining the goals of
federalism. Most significantly, bailouts result in a softening of the budget constraint
that states face. Each new bailout erodes the incentive for fiscal responsibility in the
future, jeopardizing the supposed efficiency benefits of decentralization. Moreover,
to the extent that federal bailouts come with strings attached (as is almost always
the case), state fiscal autonomy is also compromised.12 Over time, if states cannot
responsibly manage their own finances, there will be increasing pressure to return
the task of revenue raising to the federal government. Centralized funding in turn
implies either federal control over policy or legal controversy over the rules for
disbursing federal grants.
We propose to address these problems by designing a set of federal policies to
encourage states to establish robust rainy day funds (RDFs) subject to restrictions
on withdrawal except in the case of genuine fiscal emergency. The basic
framework of our proposal is not without precedent. Over the past several decades,
Congress has established a broad range of federal incentives to encourage
household savings—such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)
plans. The problem that motivated those provisions is, in many ways, similar to that
faced by state governments today, yet no such program to encourage state savings
exists.
Given the stakes for the national economy and the collective action problem
facing states, federal intervention is both merited and necessary. Moreover, the
problem in the United States is one largely of the federal government’s making. By
devolving an increasing share of social insurance functions to states over the last
two decades, Congress has rendered these programs increasingly vulnerable to the
fiscal vicissitudes of the states13—a vulnerability that the national government, with
its indifference to exit pressures and vastly superior borrowing capability, does not
share.
Surprisingly, despite the recurrence of state budget crises and the broad
academic consensus in favor of rainy day funds, there is almost no scholarship in
any discipline on how to design an RDF system that would actually work.14 One

10. See sources cited in footnote 9.
11. See Robert P. Inman, States in Fiscal Distress, 6 REG’L ECON. DEV. 65, 65–66
(2010), http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/red/2010/01/Inman.pdf.
12. Id. at 69–70.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 30–36.
14. To be sure, rainy day funds are not the only possible solution to state budget
dilemmas. For example, David Gamage argues that states could alleviate some budgetary
pressure by changing how they structure their tax systems. David Gamage, Preventing State
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official at the Federal Reserve has written a brief conference paper proposing that
states might establish a shared pool of emergency funds.15 That is a good starting
point, although—as we discuss further below—in our view that approach is likely
to be unworkable because of the moral hazard and common-pool problems it would
create. Others have examined which features of state RDFs make them more or less
effective.16 But as noted above, states have little incentive to adopt even effective
policies. These problems suggest that federal intervention is likely needed, yet there
has not been any analysis of how federal intervention could facilitate state savings.
As a result, our effort here is in many ways preliminary, in that we hope that
ours will be only the first of many efforts toward designing an efficacious RDF
system. Because there is still much the scholarly community does not know about
why RDFs fail, we cannot confidently claim that there is one perfect solution to the
RDF problem. Instead, we start with first principles, attempting to diagnose more
precisely the political failures that doom rainy day funds and suggesting alternative
solutions for each possible failure.
The central diagnostic problem in designing a federally supported RDF program
is that it is unclear whether the current state failures are attributable to individual
voters, state officials, or both.17 There are good reasons to think both groups are
biased in favor of spending over savings. But there are also plausible theoretical
arguments that either one might be willing to save under the right circumstances.
Economic theory suggests that state budget surpluses should increase land values,
providing an immediate financial reward at least for homeowners in responsible
states. Similarly, studies find that RDFs improve a jurisdiction’s credit rating by
lowering borrowing costs and thereby freeing up extra funds for officials to spend
in the short term.18
Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 792–811
(2010). As Gamage notes, however, rainy day funds would be the “first-best” solution—if
they worked. Id. at 765–66.
15. Richard Mattoon, Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to
Improve State Fiscal Performance (Fed’l Res. Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 20,
2003).
16. Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Rainy Day Funds and State Government Savings, 52
NAT’L TAX J. 459, 468–69 (1999); Dean Stansel & David T. Mitchell, State Fiscal Crises:
Are Rapid Spending Increases to Blame?, 28 CATO J. 435, 435, 445–46 (2008); Gary A.
Wagner & Erick M. Elder, The Role of Budget Stabilization Funds in Smoothing
Government Expenditures Over the Business Cycle, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 439, 441, 459 (2005);
see Antonio Fatás & Ilan Mihov, The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Rules in the US
States, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 101, 111 (2006); Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business
Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 715, 726–27 (1998); Sobel & Holcombe,
supra note 9, at 37; see also Gonzalez & Paqueo, supra note 9, at 9; cf. James W. Douglas &
Ronald Keith Gaddie, State Rainy Day Funds and Fiscal Crises: Rainy Day Funds and the
1990–1991 Recession Revisited, 22 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. REV. 19, 25 (2002); Yilin Hou,
Fiscal Reserves and State Own-Source Expenditure in Downturn Years, 33 PUB. FIN. REV.
117, 130 (2005).
17. For explanation of the points in this paragraph, see infra text accompanying notes
64–105.
18. Cleopatra Charles, The Impact of Budget Stabilization Funds on State General
Obligation Bond Ratings, 31 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., no. 2, 2010, at 3, 12 (also finding that
more stringent RDF rules “are associated with higher credit ratings”).
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Identifying the sites of the political failures is important because it allows for
better design of federal policies to encourage state savings. For instance, if voters
favor RDFs but their representatives are incapable of satisfying that preference, a
federal policy giving immediate benefits to elected officials, such as unrestricted
grant funds, might flip the state officials’ incentives and trigger significant RDF
utilization. On the other hand, if state officials would favor RDFs but the idea lacks
popular support, it might be preferable to design a federal subsidy more directly
targeted at reversing voter preferences, such as a federal income tax deduction set
to the taxpayer’s per capita share of the state’s annual amount saved.
It is also useful to understand why a particular failure happens. For example, we
argue that the nature of present bias allows for the design of psychologically
informed policy tools that could flip bias against itself. Thus, we suggest letting
states “save more tomorrow,” as Thaler and Sunstein have suggested for individual
savings toward retirement.19 Because present-biased officials will discount both the
future costs of savings as well as the rewards, they may be willing to agree in the
present to commit to saving in the future at a fraction of the cost of agreeing to start
saving immediately. On the individual level, present bias can be used to get voters
to reveal the extent of their preference for immediate rewards, allowing the
government more easily to identify those who oppose savings policies.
Again, though, savings are only half the story; there must also be mechanisms
for protecting RDFs against premature “raids,” so that the resources set aside will
be available when a recession hits. Accordingly, we also consider alternative
methods of restricting RDF withdrawals. Allowing states to control their own
funds, subject to federal approval of the state plan or federal penalties for early
withdrawal, might permit more flexibility and innovation. But it also opens the
door to rent-seeking and the pathologies of state budgeting. Alternately, granting
control to federal officials can insulate RDFs from state politics albeit at the cost of
particularized information about state needs. The optimal tradeoff therefore is hard
to identify in the abstract; some experimentation is likely required.
Part I of this Article will explain in more detail the causes of states’ budget
woes, and why those problems call for national solutions. Part II attempts to
diagnose why RDFs, despite their theoretical appeal, have failed to significantly
improve states’ ability to weather economic downturns. Part III offers a menu of
options for encouraging states to make contributions; our discussion is largely
informal, but readers who desire some mathematical modeling can find it in the
margins throughout this Part. Part IV similarly outlines the tradeoffs policy makers
face in any effort to encourage states to retain money in their savings funds until
recessions actually strike. We then conclude.
I. THE CASE FOR STATE RAINY DAY FUNDS
In a world where revenues perfectly matched expenditures there would be no
need for borrowing or saving in order to maintain government spending obligations
over time. Unfortunately, governments at all levels routinely face a mismatch

19. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 114–19 (2d ed. 2009).
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between inflows and outflows, and thus must confront the question of how to
manage budget surpluses and deficits. At the state and local level, structural
changes in the fiscal landscape over the past quarter century have led to increased
volatility in both revenues and expenditures over the business cycle. It bears
emphasizing that there is great variation among the states. With that caveat,
however, certain general tendencies nevertheless clearly emerge.
On the revenue side of the equation, key structural changes in state and local tax
systems over the past three decades have resulted in a significant increase in
revenue volatility over the business cycle. Numerous factors are no doubt at work,
but three developments in particular deserve emphasis here.
First, state and local governments have increased their reliance on personal
income taxes significantly over the past three decades. Whereas in 1977 personal
income taxes accounted for only 16.6% of total state and local tax revenues, by
2007 they accounted for 22.5% of the total.20 Because income taxes generally
exhibit greater variability over the business cycle than other taxes, this change in
the composition of the tax base has increased the volatility of state and local tax
receipts. Not surprisingly, concern about the effects of revenue volatility on state
and local budgeting has been the greatest in states that have experienced the largest
increase in reliance on personal income taxes. In California, for example, personal
income taxes as a share of all state and local taxes nearly doubled over the past
thirty years, increasing from 15.2% in 1977 to 30% in 2007.21 In part because of
this shift, California has become the nation’s poster child for subnational fiscal
turmoil.22
A second, related development is the reduced reliance on property taxes. In
1977, property taxes accounted for 35.5% of total state and local tax revenues, but
by 2007 that figure had dropped to 30.3%.23 In effect, state and local governments
have swapped out a portion of property tax revenues for income tax revenues.
Because property taxes are a relatively stable source of revenue, this change has
resulted in a more volatile tax mix for state and local governments. Again, there is
substantial variation among the states worth noting. About a third of the states
actually increased their reliance on property taxes from 1977 to 2007, including
Texas and Florida (both of which have constitutional prohibitions on personal
income taxes), but in the remaining states property taxes accounted for a smaller

20. THE
URBAN
INSTITUTE-BROOKINGS
INST.
TAX
POLICY
CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/dqs_table_49.pdf (2010).
21. State
&
Local
Government
Finance
Data
Query
System.
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/slf-dqs/pages.cfm. The Urban Institute-Brookings Institution
Tax Policy Center. Data from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances, Government Finances, Volume 4, and Census of Governments.
22. Stark, supra note 6, at 432–36; see also Robert Frank, The Price of Taxing the Rich,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2011, at C1; but see INST. ON TAX. & ECON. POL’Y, IN IT FOR THE
LONG HAUL: WHY CONCERNS OVER PERSONAL INCOME TAX “VOLATILITY” ARE OVERBLOWN
1 (2011), available at www.itepnet.org/pdf/volatility_0311.pdf.
23. State and Local Property Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Tax Revenue,
Selected Years 1977-2009, THE URBAN INSTITUTE-BROOKINGS INST. TAX POLICY CTR.
[hereinafter State and Local Property Tax], http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/
PDF/dqs_table_83.pdf.
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share of total taxes in 2007 than in 1977.24 California, the epicenter of the property
tax revolt in the mid-1970s with its famed Proposition 13, dramatically reduced its
reliance on the property tax over the ensuing three decades.25 In 1977, the year
before Proposition 13 was approved by California voters, property tax revenues
accounted for 42.1% of the Golden State’s total tax revenue; by 2007, that figure
had dropped to 27%.26
Finally, a substantial nationwide increase in income inequality over the past
thirty years has resulted in an ever larger share of personal income tax revenues
coming from high-income households. This well-documented shift is evident in
numerous statistical measures. For example, the Gini coefficient for U.S.
households, perhaps the most common measure of income inequality, increased
from .402 in 1977 to .463 in 2007.27 Perhaps more intuitively, the share of total
income earned by the top 5% of the income distribution increased significantly
over this period, rising from 16.8% in 1977 to 21.2% in 2007.28 In other words, just
as state and local governments were retreating from the property tax, the income
tax base into which they were shifting was becoming increasingly concentrated in a
smaller number of households. One important effect of this shift was that state and
local budgets became more and more sensitive to the economic fortunes of the
country’s highest earners. Unlike low- and middle-income households, wealthy
households derive a substantial share of their income from notoriously volatile
sources, such as capital gains, dividends, restricted stock, and stock options. As one
of California’s most highly regarded revenue forecasters remarked, “‘[w]e built a
large part of our government on the state’s most unstable income group.’”29
Structural changes in the composition of state and local government
expenditures have likewise contributed to the sensitivity of state and local budgets
to the business cycle. State and local governments are major providers of social
insurance in the United States.30 Although federal rules often set out the basic
framework for the various tools of social insurance, subnational governments
supply much of the money and policy detail.31 Unemployment insurance, Medicaid,
supplemental nutrition programs, and temporary assistance to needy families

24. Id.
25. Robert W. Wassmer, California’s State and Local Revenue Structure after
Proposition 13: Is Denial the Appropriate Way to Copy?, in STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL
POLICY: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX? 98, 98 (Sally Wallace ed., 2010) (noting the dramatic
reduction in California’s reliance on the property tax post-Prop 13).
26. State and Local Property Tax, supra note 23.
27. Table H-4. Gini Ratios for Households, by Race and Hispanic Origin of
Householder: 1967 to 2009, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic
Supplements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/
historical/inequality/index.html.
28. Id. at Table H-2. Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5
Percent of Households, All Races: 1967 to 2009.
29. Frank, supra note 22.
30. DIANA M. DINITTO, SOCIAL WELFARE: POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27 (7th ed.
2011).
31. Kenneth Finegold, The United States: Federalism and Its Counter-Factuals, in
FEDERALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE: NEW WORLD AND EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES 138, 152–
59 (Herbert Obinger, Stephen Leibfried, & Francis G. Castles, eds., 2005).
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(TANF) all rely heavily on state administration, albeit with substantial fiscal
support and guidance from the federal government.32
The trend since the 1980s has been to shift responsibility for social insurance
downwards.33 Defenders of this “devolution revolution” emphasize the federalism
benefits that can come with local administration: a closer match between local
preferences and the extent of social insurance offered, greater flexibility, and
perhaps greater experimentation and responsiveness.34 Cynics note that the shift
also eases budget pressures on Congress.35 Whatever the explanation, the
devolution of social insurance programs has increasingly exposed the system to the
volatility of state budgets.36
State budgeting differs from national budgeting in several crucial respects.
Perhaps most importantly, states cannot print their own money.37 As a result, this
age-old method of raising revenue via currency debasement is simply not available
to state governments. Two other factors, though, account for many of the
differences we focus on here. First, interstate migration of both households and
firms is relatively common in the United States.38 Second, citizens of one state do
not vote in other states, with the result that each state’s officials have little reason to
care about the impact of their actions on residents of other jurisdictions.39 In
contrast, it is very costly to leave the United States altogether, and the national
government is relatively more sensitive to the welfare of the entire country.40
The first factor, the threat of exit, has made it challenging for states, and
especially local governments, to raise money to pay for social insurance during
recessions. Many studies have shown that taxpayers consider relative burdens when
deciding where to live or do business.41 Further, the credible threat of exit also

32. Id.
33. Super, supra note 4, at 2575–76; see Andrew Reschovsky, The Impact of State
Government Fiscal Crises on Local Governments and Schools, 36 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV.
86, 86–102 (2004).
34. E.g., Michael S. Greve, Big Government Federalism, AEI OUTLOOKS, at 5–6 (Mar.
2001), http://www.aei.org/docLib/Big%20Government%20Federalism.pdf.
35. Super, supra note 4, at 2584–85.
36. Thomas L. Gais, Stretched Net: The Retrenchment of State and Local Social Welfare
Spending Before the Recession, 39 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 557, 564, 573–74 (2009); see
Super, supra note 4, at 2591–93 (explaining sources of state vulnerability to federal aid
reductions).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
38. For individuals, see William A.V. Clark & Suzanne Davies Withers, Family
Migration and Mobility Sequences in the United States: Spatial Mobility in the Context of
the Life Course, 17 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 591, 592 (2007). For firms, see Jeffrey A. Frankel,
Measuring International Capital Mobility: A Review, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 197, 197–202
(1992).
39. Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 937, 976–77 (2008).
40. Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 519–20 (2004).
41. See, e.g., Richard J. Cebula, Internal Migration Determinants: Recent Evidence, 11
INT’L ADVANCES ECON. IN RES. 267, 272 (2005) (reporting that cost of living affects
migration patterns); Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith, Taxes and the Location of
Production: Evidence from a Panel of US Multinationals, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 335, 335, 351–58
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gives additional political voice to the most mobile.42 For similar reasons, states also
cannot easily borrow; since public debt augurs higher future taxes, large debt
burdens, too, create exit pressure.43
Present bias and other forms of externalities also lead to a political environment
that heavily curtails state borrowing. Present bias is simply the tendency of an
individual to favor the present over the future, and in the fiscal context, it can result
either from either political or psychological factors.44 Politically, voters and
officials may both anticipate that they will not be around when the future comes:
they may die, they may move, or they may be voted or term-limited out of office,
so that the future costs represent an intertemporal externality.45 Evidence suggests
that individuals are often unable to resist the temptation to live for today, even if
our objective preference would be to plan for tomorrow.46 Present bias manifests
itself in policymaking at all levels of government, but it is arguably more acute at
the subnational level because of the prospect of interjurisdictional mobility. At the
state and local level, the present is separated from the future not only by time but

(1998); Peter John, Keith Dowding, & Stephen Biggs, Residential Mobility in London: A
Micro-Level Test of the Behavioural Assumptions of the Tiebout Model, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
379, 379 (1995) (“Taxes and services are found to be important factors in the moving
decision . . . .”); Joseph M. Phillips & Ernest P. Goss, The Effect of State and Local Taxes on
Economic Development: A Meta-Analysis, 62 S. ECON. J. 320, 320, 323–29 (1995); Hui
Shan, Property Taxes and Elderly Mobility, 67 J. URB. ECON. 194, 194 (2010) (finding that
rising property taxes cause older households to relocate).
42. Gillette, supra note 39, at 966; see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The
New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best
World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 264–65 (1997); see also Emmanuelle Reulier & Yvon Rocaboy,
Regional Tax Competition: Evidence from French Regions, 43 REGIONAL STUD. 915 (2009)
(finding that main source of pressure on individual income tax rates in competing localities
is ability of individuals to compare their own rates against neighbors and threaten to punish
underperforming officials).
43. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 198–200; see Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless,
Pension Reform and Saving, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 703, 717–18 (2004) (interpreting their own
empirical findings on unfunded pension obligations as supporting this argument).
44. For a technical definition, see Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin & Andrew Schotter,
Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs, 69 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
205, 205–06 (2010). To see present bias mathematically, suppose that we represent an
agent’s subjective present value of future consumption as βc, where δ is a standard discount
rate, such as is produced by a market rate of interest, and beta is a special discount, between
0 and 1, that the individual applies only to future consumption. A rational, unbiased actor
allocating resources across time maximizes current consumption subject to future
consumption, u1 + δu2 + δ2u3 + . . . δnun. But the present-biased actor excessively discounts
future consumption, maximizing instead u1 +β δu2 + βδ2u3 +. . . βδnun.
45. Gary A. Wagner, Political Control and Public Sector Savings: Evidence from the
States, 109 PUB. CHOICE 149, 150 (2001); Michael Wolkoff, An Evaluation of Municipal
Rainy Day Funds, 7 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 52, 61 (1987).
46. GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE
MOTIVATIONAL STATS WITHIN THE PERSON 63–80 (1992); Richard H. Thaler, Some
Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 127, 128
(Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991).
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also, potentially, by space. It may be perfectly rational for those who anticipate a
future elsewhere not to fully internalize the cost of future debt payments.47
Present bias should predictably lead to excessive borrowing, which
paradoxically is why state borrowing is so difficult.48 Borrowing offers rewards
today, such as the opportunity for officials to buy off important constituencies, or
offer incentives for mobile taxpayers to relocate to their jurisdiction; the costs
arrive only later, perhaps after the official is out of power. However, over time
electorates, recognizing this dynamic, have imposed significant restrictions on
public officials, such as constitutional debt limitations and balanced budget
requirements.49
These limitations necessarily (and intentionally) make it difficult for states to
rely on borrowing as a strategy for smoothing government expenditures over the
business cycle. In combination with the increased volatility of state revenue
structures discussed above, restrictions on subnational borrowing exacerbate fiscal
distress during economic downturns.50 Revenue declines associated with cyclical
variability in the economy are naturally to be expected, but states have a limited
range of policy instruments available to them to weather the storm. Often the only
choice that states have is to curtail governmental services. Historically, the deepest
recessionary cuts have been exactly in those areas most needed during recessions:
social insurance and aid to the poor.51
These facts would seem to set up a strong case for federal intervention. Since the
national government faces much weaker exit pressures, it has more freedom to use
taxes to pay for social insurance during downturns.52 While the same present bias
described above no doubt exerts an influence at the national level as well, the
federal government has never bound its own borrowing capacity as tightly as the
states, perhaps because present bias is lower, or because a central government faces
less pressure to borrow in order to compete with its neighbors.53 National budgeting
also allows for fiscal diversification; regions that are less impacted by a downturn
can support those that are in greater need.54 Even if states did not face taxing and

47. Levinson, supra note 16, at 716.
48. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 200–04.
49. Levinson, supra note 16, at 717. There are other forces, such as political and bond
market pressures, that limit borrowing as well. See Douglas & Gaddie, supra note 16, at 20.
On state constitutional debt limitations, see D. Roderick Kiewiet and Kristin Szakaly,
Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 62, 67 tbl.1 (1996).
50. Hou, supra note 16, at 123; Levinson, supra note 16, at 717–19; Gary A. Wagner &
Erick M. Elder, Revenue Cycles and the Distribution of Shortfalls in U.S. States:
Implications for an “Optimal” Rainy Day Fund, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 727, 728 (2007).
51. Super, supra note 4, at 2614–40.
52. See Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal
Government Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1408–10
(2004) (describing debate over this issue, and noting evidence in favor of conclusion that
decentralized redistribution is difficult).
53. See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U.ILL. L.
REV. 1105, 1106–10 (noting failure of various efforts to enact federal balanced budget
requirement).
54. Levinson, supra note 16, at 724.
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borrowing constraints, they might still spend inadequately on social insurance from
a national perspective.55 State economies are heavily intertwined56—recessions in
New York hurt New Jersey and Connecticut, too—but each state has little incentive
to take neighboring welfare into account when deciding how much to spend.
Unfortunately, existing forms of federal support for struggling states have
serious flaws. Discretionary federal supports, such as the most recent stimulus bill,
often miss the mark in their timing and size, and they may demand substantial
amounts of inefficient spending—for example, pork-barrel spending—to win
passage.57 Automatically triggered responses, such as David Super’s suggestion of
variable federal subsidies for state unemployment assistance in an amount
determined by local need, are difficult to design, in part because they represent a
kind of bailout.58 Since states know that they are insured against losses, they may
take less care to avoid fiscal disaster.59 The federal tax system does already (and
accidentally) include a version of this automatic bailout, but as recent experience
demonstrates, even that has not prevented major suffering at the state level during
downturns.60 Finally, ongoing supports, such as Canada’s revenue-sharing system,
might encourage excessive state spending, especially during boom times.61
One largely unexplored alternative to these designs is to encourage states to
save, rather than borrow. As many other commentators have recognized, if states
could save effectively when times are good they would have little need to borrow
when times are bad.62 A typical vehicle for state savings is the RDF. The state

55. See Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline
with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35, 45–47 (Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland & Jennie
Litvack eds., 2003) (discussing extraterritorial effects of local fiscal failures); see also
Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal
Rules for Economic Stabilization, 42 IMF STAFF PAPERS 32, 46 (1995) (“[S]tate budgets
played a significant role in macroeconomic stabilization in the 1970s and 1980s . . . .”).
56. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Can We Decentralize Our
Unemployment Policies? Evidence from the United States, 54 KYKLOS 287, 301 (2001); see
also Thomas A. Garrett, Gary A. Wagner, & David C. Wheelock, Regional Disparities in the
Spatial Correlation of State Income Growth, 1977–2002, 41 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 601,
601–18 (2007) (measuring influence of U.S. state growth on neighbors’ economies). More
generally, neighboring economies of any kind exert strong impacts on the success of trading
partners. See generally Ramon Moreno & Bharat Trehan, Location and the Growth of
Nations, 2 J. ECON. GROWTH 399, 399–418 (1997).
57. Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L.
REV. 171, 180 (2003).
58. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 205–07.
59. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and
Moral Hazard, 64 ECONOMETRICA 623, 629–35 (1996).
60. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 210–35.
61. See Kirk J. Stark, Rich States, Poor States: Assessing the Design and Effectiveness
of a U.S. Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63 TAX L. REV. 957, 959 (2010); see 2 DEP’T OF
TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 63–64 (1984)
(making this point about federal deductibility of state taxes).
62. Inman, supra note 11, at 78; see Wagner & Elder, supra note 16, at 441; see also
Philip G. Joyce, What’s So Magical About Five Percent? A Nationwide Look at Factors that
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simply sets aside a portion of its unused tax revenues in an account, with some
limitations on the account to prevent the money there from being spent, except in a
time of fiscal need.63 If the federal government could encourage long-term use of
RDFs, the flaws of all the other federal mechanisms could be avoided.
Of course, one might wonder, if RDFs are so great, why it should be that states
need any encouragement to embrace them. We turn now to that question; in the
Parts that follow, we analyze potential federal solutions to the failures we identify.
II. FAILURES OF EXISTING RAINY DAY FUND DESIGNS
In the presence of revenue volatility and borrowing constraints, rainy day funds
have an obvious appeal as a potential method of smoothing government
expenditures over the business cycle. Unfortunately, experience shows that existing
funds have thus far failed to live up to their promise. In Part II.A., we explore some
of the possible explanations for why states have not adequately utilized RDFs.
Identifying the fault lines is critical, because even if states cannot correct flaws on
their own, it may be possible to design federal policies that will make RDFs a more
viable tool for smoothing state and local government spending over the business
cycle.
A. Understanding the Failure of State RDFs
Although nearly every state has some form of RDF, studies have shown that
they have been inadequate in sheltering state budgets from recessionary revenue
declines.64 This is not to suggest that there is nothing to learn from state experience
with RDFs. A few public finance scholars have begun to examine cross-state
variation in the design of state RDFs in an effort to determine which features are
most likely to predict RDF balances at a level adequate to protect against
recessionary revenue declines. For example, RDFs vary in their rules both for when
a state must make contributions to the fund as well as rules for when funds can be
withdrawn.65 In general, studies have shown that a combination of strict rules
requiring states to make contributions to their funds, together with rules limiting
when legislatures are allowed to make withdrawals, seems to be the most effective
mechanism for ensuring the efficacy of the fund.66 Unfortunately, the combination
of binding deposit requirements and withdrawal restrictions is rare.67

Influence the Optimal Size of State Rainy Day Funds, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., 62, 79–82
(2001); see also Super, supra note 4, at 2643–44.
63. Gary A. Wagner & Russell S. Sobel, State Budget Stabilization Fund Adoption:
Preparing for the Next Recession or Circumventing Fiscal Constraints?, 126 PUB. CHOICE
177, 180 (2006); see Hou, supra note 16, at 120 (discussing the role of budget stabilization
funds).
64. See sources cited supra note 9.
65. See Gary A. Wagner, The Bond Market and Fiscal Institutions: Have Budget
Stabilization Funds Reduced State Borrowing Costs?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 785, 787 tbl.1 (2004)
(listing state rules).
66. See sources cited supra note 16.
67. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 787 tbl.1.
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These results suggest that RDFs suffer from many of the same problems of
present bias discussed above. When lawmakers are not legally obligated to deposit
funds into a budget stabilization fund, they tend not to do so. In addition, legal
ambiguity regarding the circumstances in which RDF balances may be accessed are
typically resolved in favor of withdrawal. Only when states tie their own hands and
force themselves to save are they able to forego present consumption (understood
here as either increased spending or reduced taxes) in order to augment RDF
balances. It is not clear whether the source of this present bias results from the
incentives of officials, of individual voters, or both. Studies to date have not
focused on that question, although some of them offer some evidence one way or
another, as we will now explain.
1. Individual Voters
While there is some polling evidence to suggest popular support for RDFs,68
there are several reasons to expect a state’s residents to be skeptical about the value
of such funds. As with borrowing, some voters may be excessively present-focused
and thus inclined to favor current spending (or tax cuts) over saving for a rainy day.
Moreover, the chief benefit of robust RDF balances—that is, the economic stability
derived from avoiding drastic service cutbacks in the face of recessionary revenue
declines—is in the nature of a public good, so that one would expect there rarely
will be a coherent political constituency in favor of budget stability for its own
sake.69 Even those with the strongest preferences for state savings may see little
value in insisting on more robust RDFs if they fear that fund balances will not be
used for their intended purposes.70 It is well established that long-term budgetary
commitments require the support of durable political coalitions, and the
maintenance of such coalitions is costly.71 To ensure that RDFs serve their intended
function, proponents must invest in continual oversight and lobbying, making the
potential costs to them of preserving savings in the long term prohibitively high.72
There is one sense in which individuals might be expected to internalize the
benefits of RDFs. To the extent that fiscal stability (or, framed differently, the

68. See What’s Next California? DELIBERATIVE POLL 6 (June 24–26, 2011),
http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/california/2011/nextca-results.pdf.
69. Cf. Gillette, supra note 39, at 955 (making this point about misuse of public funds).
A “public good” is one for which the purchase by one person allows others also to consume
it. Thus, each individual has an incentive to free ride on the purchase by others, resulting in
lower than optimal consumption overall.
70. This is an application of the general problem that any political coalition must
account for the possibility of future changes in determining how much effort to exert in
pushing for legislative change. Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative
Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV.
499, 503, 505 (1989).
71. Cf. Staudt, supra note 53, at 1160–63 (explaining ease with which politicians may
renege on budget commitments).
72. See Horn & Shepsle, supra note 70, at 503–07 (explaining strategic interactions
between officials and constituents when laws are subject to revision).
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absence of instability) is valued by incoming households and businesses, it is
possible that an effective RDF could be reflected in increased property values (and
thus home prices and local rents). If government indebtedness implies higher future
taxes, and a corresponding impairment of property values,73 then excess funds
stored in an RDF should imply the opposite—that is, property values should rise on
the prospect of lower future tax burdens made possible by RDF balances.74 In
effect, the “capitalization” of RDF balances into property values enables current
residents to realize in the present some of the future benefits of savings.75 In theory,
the most direct beneficiaries of capitalization (homeowners and other owners of
immobile factors) might even lobby against premature raids of RDF balances in
order to protect the value of their assets. To the extent that RDF balances are
capitalized into property values, this would also reduce the credibility of exit
threats by homeowners demanding immediate expenditures since rising home
values are objective evidence that the jurisdiction is becoming more, not less,
desirable.76 But typically the homeowner story is more powerful in local rather than
state politics, which may explain why it has not significantly impacted state-level
savings so far. 77
2. Official Incentives
In a similar fashion, theory offers conflicting predictions about official
preferences for RDF savings. Once again the uncertainty derives chiefly from the

73. See Reiner Eichenberger and David Stadelmann, How Federalism Protects Future
Generations from Today’s Public Debts, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 395, 396 (2010) (reporting
authors’ findings that local debt in Swiss cantons reduced home values).
74. See Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J.
POL. ECON. 957, 959 (1969) (explaining that value of local government should be reflected
in home prices). This assumes that there is some limit on new home construction, which
generally occurs either through restrictive zoning, physical limitations on the amount of
undeveloped property, or both. Of course, renters might have the opposite view, Levinson,
supra note 16, at 731 n.1, but conventionally homeowners are by far the more powerful
political force.
75. Cf. Oded Palmon & Barton A. Smith, New Evidence on Property Tax
Capitalization, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1099, 1099–100, 1106 (1998) (reporting new and prior
evidence that housing values reflect future tax liabilities).
76. In those jurisdictions with an annual cap on property tax assessment increases, rising
home values also result in lock-in, because relocation even to a home of equal value would
result in higher property taxes. See Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Do Caps on Increases in Assessed
Values Create a Lock-in Effect? Evidence from Florida’s Amendment One, 64 NAT’L TAX J.
7, 19–20 (2011).
77. For contrasting views on the homeowner cohesion point, compare WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 73–76 (2001) (arguing
that homeowners in small and moderate-sized jurisdictions share enough social and
geographic ties to be a cohesive unit) with Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—
Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 400–22 (1990) (describing situations in
which this social cohesion breaks down).
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problem of officials’ limited-time horizon: to the extent that public officials expect
to have a limited time in office, they may favor current spending (or reduced taxes)
over a robust RDF, especially if saving would simply transfer funds to their
political rivals.78 This view has some empirical support.79 And just as the
opportunity to borrow against future revenue creates a common pool from which
officials may race to fish, an existing RDF balance is also a shared resource subject
to the pressures of competitive depletion.80 These factors do not bode well for the
success of state RDFs.
Pointing in the other direction is the possibility that RDF balances might lower
the state’s cost of borrowing. Gary Wagner, for example, finds that states with the
most restrictive RDF rules have higher RDF balances and pay lower interest rates
on general obligation bonds.81 Wagner argues that this relation is causal and that
RDF balances effectively serve as a security deposit for bondholders in that they
represent funds available for debt repayment.82 In support of this view is the fact
that the major municipal bond credit-rating agencies consider RDF balances when
rating issuer creditworthiness.83 Since higher bond ratings translate directly into
lower interest rates,84 this implies that RDF contributions could well lower the cost
of public borrowing. Present-biased officials, therefore, can capture at least a
portion of the value of any savings through reduced current-year debt service
expenses.85 Lower borrowing costs also will typically allow legislatures to borrow
more under their own budgeting rules, again expanding the resources available
immediately to legislators.86

78. See Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and
Government Debt, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 403, 412 (1990); Lars P. Feld & Gebhard
Kirschgässner, Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt? Evidence from Swiss
Municipalities, 109 PUB. CHOICE 347, 350 (2001); cf. H. Abbie Erler, Legislative Term
Limits and State Spending, 133 PUB. CHOICE 479, 486–88 (2007) (finding that legislative
term limits increase spending).
79. See Chara Dalle Nogare & Roberto Ricciuti, Term Limits: Do They Really Affect
Fiscal Policy Choices? 4 (CESifo Grp., Working Paper No. 2199, 2008) (surveying other
studies).
80. See Wagner, supra note 45, at 150; Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, &
Christopher Johnsen, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach
to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 642–64 (1981).
81. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 786; see also Charles, supra note 18, at 3, 12 (also
finding that more stringent RDF rules “are associated with higher credit ratings”).
82. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 789; see also Mattoon, supra note 15, at 2.
83. See Mattoon, supra note 15, at 5, 8.
84. See Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, Impact of Three Credit Ratings on Interest
Cost of State GO Bonds, 23 MUN. FIN. J. 1, 1–16 (2002).
85. For a more formal model, see Wagner, supra note 45, at 155–57.
86. See Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, A Framework for Understanding State Balanced
Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features and an Operational System,
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 22, 38–39 (2006) (noting most states require that revenues meet all
expenditures). For a general overview of state budgeting matters, including a discussion of
balanced budget provisions, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL
FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (2010), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf.
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Another possible mechanism for officials to translate the future gains of savings
into present utility is by using RDF contributions as a credible signal of fiscal
prudence. Although we are not aware of any scholarly analysis of the signaling
effect of RDFs, in theory they should send a signal of fiscal prudence to inside and
outside monitors of the jurisdiction’s officials. Thus, RDFs can serve elected
officials in much the way payment of dividends serves firm managers, as a costly
(and therefore credible) signal of individual performance.87
In addition to signaling sound fiscal stewardship skills, RDF contributions may
also credibly reveal to voters that the official is a good “type”—that is, that the
official values voters’ long-term interests over the official’s political self-interest.88
Ordinarily, voters who value the state’s long-term fiscal health have no easy way of
judging which politicians feel similarly, except through after-the-fact
retrospection.89 And history suggests that officials can easily manipulate these
kinds of ex-post evaluations.90 Thus, RDF contributions allow the politician to
signal fiscal responsibility to such voters more credibly than with the cheap talk of
a mere promise.
As a caveat to these points, we note that the signaling value of RDF
contributions is likely to be dominated by the signaling value of tax cuts. In the
same way that RDF contributions put resources beyond the control of current
lawmakers, and thus serve as a costly signal of an ability to “make do with less,”
officials may use their support of tax cuts as a signal of fiscal rectitude. Tax
reductions likewise involve relinquishing control over resources, with the possible
(though debatable) implication being that the official’s management has been so
efficient that additional funds are unneeded. Alternately, the act of giving up
control over the funds could imply that the official is not self-serving but instead is
looking out for the interests of constituents. Unlike a rainy day fund, however, the
tax cut returns money to the immediate use of the voter.91 Thus, the political
rewards for enacting a tax cut seem likely to outweigh those for funding an RDF.92

87. Corporate finance scholars hypothesize that corporate officers pay dividends in
order to signal credibly to shareholders the officers’ success: the manager is so confident of
her position that she does not need to horde cash to protect against buyouts, and she is so
concerned with shareholders’ interests that she would rather have shareholders use the
money than use it for her own idiosyncratic ends. Because talk is cheap, such claims would
be meaningless unless backed up by an actual costly sacrifice on the part of the manager;
thus the manager’s sacrifice of her own use of the money makes the signal credible. See
Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN.
1031, 1031–51 (1985); Michal Barzuza, Lemon Signaling in Cross-Listing 5–6 (Oct. 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1022282. The reason that the RDF is a costly signal is because the current
official is giving up use of the money for her own preferred projects.
88. Cf. Kenneth Rogoff, Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 21, 32
(1990) (suggesting that competent officials can signal their skill by refusing to manipulate
fiscal policy for their own benefit).
89. See Alberto Alesina, Filipe R. Campante, and Guido Tabellini, Why Is Fiscal Policy
Often Procyclical?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1006, 1012–13 (2008).
90. Staudt, supra note 53, at 1160–63.
91. A rainy day fund is indistinguishable from a tax cut under perfect Ricardian
equivalence, but perfect equivalence is unlikely at the state level because taxpayers can
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3. Federal Intervention
Some commentators have also suggested that central governments are somewhat
to blame for fiscal irresponsibility by their subnational components.93 In this story,
the states expect that federal taxpayers will offer them a “bailout” if any state’s
finances crater. Because state recessions harm neighboring states as well as the
federal fisc, a state could calculate that even purely self-interested neighboring
officials would have reasons to help the state when it is in need.94 As we mentioned
earlier, implicit insurance of this kind could contribute to moral hazard, leading
states to take fewer precautions to protect themselves against downturns. Since
rainy day funds are one form of precaution states could choose, the possibility of
federal bailouts may itself be a factor that undermines states’ willingness to save.
Evidence on whether this form of moral hazard is a serious problem in the
United States is mixed. One leading public finance economist has argued that the
United States is fairly unique in its ability to credibly threaten that it will not bail
out failing states.95 On the other hand, Europe’s recent sovereign debt troubles can
arguably be traced to the assumption by Euro currency member nations that the
remainder of the EU would bail them out in the event of a crisis.96
Another potential piece of U.S. evidence is the state’s response to an existing
savings program, which is embedded in the unemployment insurance finance
system. Both state and federal governments tax employers to cover the costs of
unemployment insurance (UI).97 States that deplete their available UI funds can
borrow from the federal fund.98 States that take more than a year to repay face a
modest interest charge, and if they fail to repay within two years then employers in
their state are subject to an extra charge of twenty-one dollars per employee per
year in federal UI taxes.99 The twenty-one dollar figure is a small fraction—less
than 10% on average—of the tax most employers pay.100 In short, the federal UI
fund offers reinsurance to states through a common pool, with only a mild penalty,
payable in the future, for overuse of the insurance.
Qualitative studies of state UI funding show significant evidence of moral
hazard. States routinely underfund their UI pools, and this is generally true even of

relocate. See Levinson, supra note 16, at 716.
92. Cf. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 3 (quoting Wisconsin assemblyman calling RDF an
“over-taxation fund.”).
93. E.g., Persson & Tabellini, supra note 59, at 629–35.
94. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 56, at 301 (noting interdependence of regional
labor markets).
95. Inman, supra note 55, at 59–62.
96. E.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical
Comparison, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 301, 302–03 (2012).
97. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-440, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
TRUST FUNDS: LONG-STANDING STATE FINANCING POLICIES HAVE INCREASED RISK OF
INSOLVENCY 4–5 (2010).
98. Id. at 7–8.
99. NAT’L EMPL. L. PROJECT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FINANCING IN CRISIS: HOW
SHOULD STATES RESPOND TO TRUST FUND INSOLVENCY? 1, 6 (2010),
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/UI/StateSolvencyStrategies.pdf?nocdn=1?nocdn=1.
100. Id. at 6 (reporting that average tax nationwide is about $275 per worker).

2012]

BEYOND BAILOUTS

617

states that provide less generous UI benefits.101 The federal penalty for default has
not changed since 1983, and, of course, the real value of twenty-one dollars has
declined significantly since then.102 During that time span, states’ contributions to
their own funds have declined, and state borrowing against the federal fund has
increased sharply.103 Many states have explicitly shifted to a “pay-as-you-go”
policy, which means that the state is simply refusing to save in advance for
recession-driven spikes in UI claims.104 In effect, states are planning to borrow
against the federal fund and deferring to the future the costs of repaying the
resulting loans.105 It is possible, though, that these failings are unique to the design
of the UI system. Less formal “bailout” expectations in which the pool of funds is
not expressly limited, and the penalties are not predefined as so low, might not
produce moral hazard to the same degree.
Accordingly, although we know that states do not use RDFs effectively, the
precise reasons for that failure remain unclear. However, if political breakdowns
could be identified more precisely, it should be possible to design policy
interventions to remedy those particular failures. In the ensuing Parts, we sketch
some possible interventions. We should note, though, that we do not seriously
consider here the possibility of reducing or conditioning federal “bailouts.” Overall,
although we regard states’ hopes for federal assistance as a serious potential
contributor to the current failure of rainy day funds, we regard the question of
whether the federal government should offer assistance to needy states—and if so,
under what conditions—as so complex that it warrants separate treatment, which
we reserve for future work.
B. An Interstate Borrowing Pool?
To our knowledge, the only other commentator to have considered the
possibility of some sort of federal or interstate coordination of state RDFs is
Richard Mattoon, a senior economist and economic advisor with the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago.106 Mattoon begins his analysis by emphasizing the
potentially significant nationwide benefits of counter-cyclical state spending.

101. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 9–23 (finding that crisis
in state UI funding is due to funding shortfalls, not overly generous benefits); see NAT’L
EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 99, at 5, 7 (“[T]he roots of the trust fund crisis lay in shortsighted financing decisions in the years leading up to the recession.”).
102. The penalty amount is a percentage of the “taxable wage base,” or the portion of
each employee’s income that is subject to federal tax. See supra note 102, at 5–8. Neither the
percentage nor the base of $7000 has changed since 1983. Id. at 5, 26.
103. Id. at 14–22.
104. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 99, at 6–8.
105. Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 29 (claiming that federal
loans “reduce the incentive for states to maintain robust trust funds”).
106. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 1. A proposal for “tax-base insurance” advanced by
Akash Deep and Robert Lawrence is similar in spirit to Matoon’s proposal, though quite
different in its operational details. See Akash Deep and Robert Lawrence, Stabilizing State
and Local Budgets: A Proposal for Tax-Base Insurance (Brookings Inst., Discussion Paper
2008-01, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/
06_tax_base_lawrence/ 06_tax_base_lawrence.pdf.
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Accordingly, he proposes that “a national rainy day fund be established.”107 While
we agree with the notion of federal support for state RDF funding, in our view
Mattoon’s proposal has certain shortcomings that would make it unworkable.
Mattoon’s national RDF is modeled on the federal unemployment insurance
pool. Under this federal-state partnership, states that must make unemployment
insurance payments beyond their own budget capacity are permitted to borrow
against a pool of funds shared among all the states.108 As we understand Mattoon’s
proposal, states would apparently form their own RDFs but share the money in the
RDFs with other states.109 States with lower balances in their RDF would be
required to make higher annual contributions.110 Withdrawals from the shared RDF
would be permitted only “when a state’s real revenue growth is negative, or
unemployment rises by greater than 1% from the previous year or personal income
growth is negative.”111 States that are forced to borrow from the common pool
would be required to carry a higher balance in the future.112 A “quasi-governmental
agency created by the states” would administer the fund.113
Our first and most significant concern with Mattoon’s proposal is that it seems
to encourage states to take large risks with their budgeting and even the overall
management of their economies. Because the proposed fund is a common pool,
each state faces an incentive to withdraw from the pool before the others. As each
state recognizes that other states face this same incentive, they will race to get their
money before the other participants exhaust it.114 Similarly, since the pool is a form
of budget insurance, there will be moral hazard: states can export some of the
downside risk of their budget and economic decisions onto other contributors.115
Mattoon recognizes this moral hazard problem, but his solution does not seem to
take account of the causes of RDF failure. He argues that increasing the size of the
RDF balance required for a state after it borrows can serve as a form of “experience
rating,” in effect gently punishing states that make withdrawals so that they will
internalize some of the costs of their borrowing.116 The difficulty, though, is that
the state will incur this penalty years after engaging in whatever risky behavior it is
that leads to the need for borrowing. If voters or officials are present-biased, as we
have suggested above, the opportunity to reap current benefits from premature
withdrawal seems likely to outweigh the distant threat of having to maintain higher
RDF balances. And, of course, we know that one group or the other is presentbiased. Otherwise we would not need any intervention.

107. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 3–4.
108. See id. at 3.
109. See id. at 12.
110. Id. at 13.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 13–16.
113. Id. at 17.
114. See Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal
Behavior Insurance Versus Aggregate Discipline, 62 J. INT’L ECON. 149, 151 (2004) (noting
the “common pool problem” in interjurisdictional fiscal insurance).
115. See id. at 153–54.
116. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 15–17.
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Furthermore, Mattoon’s proposal could actually undermine an alternative
mechanism for containing moral hazard. Any RDF necessarily creates some degree
of moral hazard, even if it is available only to the state that funded it since the RDF
by definition is insurance against local economic or budgetary failures. As we have
noted, however, depleting RDF balances should have the effect of increasing a
state’s borrowing costs. Thus, to the extent that rating agencies consider RDF
balances in evaluating state creditworthiness, the increased borrowing costs
associated with a reduction in RDF balances should operates as a sort of co-pay for
actors who seek to use up the funds, mitigating the moral hazard problem.117 Under
Mattoon’s proposal, however, all states would have access to the national pool of
RDF money, so the reduction in any one state’s balance presumably would have
only de minimis effects on its credit rating.
Recent experiences with Mattoon’s model, the federal unemployment insurance
fund, support our analysis.118 As we have just described, the UI funding closely
resembles Mattoon’s proposal: both are shared funding pools with only modest
future penalties for overuse. And, as we mentioned, that structure seems to have
produced significant moral hazard.
A final, more general concern we have with Mattoon’s plan is that it does not
offer a convincing case that states will participate in the shared-pool arrangement.
The pool requires up-front contributions while promising the opportunity to soften
recessions at some point in the unknown future, which of course is exactly the
temporal structure of RDFs themselves. Moreover, it is ambiguous as to whether
restricting the conditions for withdrawals increases the appeal of RDF
contributions. On one hand, withdrawal limits might appeal to voters who are
otherwise reluctant to support contributions for fear that the savings would quickly
be wasted. On the other hand, officials who prefer to have control over state funds
would likely favor contributions to a fund with fewer strings attached. Thus, it is
possible that Mattoon’s plan actually reduces the likelihood that states will save.
Put another way, we think a basic requirement of any successful plan is that it
should incentivize savings by present-biased voters, officials, or both. The next Part
offers some possibilities in that direction.
III. CONTRIBUTION MECHANISMS
Having laid out what we regard to be the case for some sort of federal support
for state RDFs as well as the shortcomings of the sole proposal in this area, we now
provide a menu of possible policy options. In this Part, we discuss possible
mechanisms for encouraging state contributions to funds while in Part IV we

117. See supra text accompanying notes 77–83. Co-pays are a standard prescription for
reducing moral hazard. See WILLARD G. MANNING & M. SUSAN MARQUIS, HEALTH
INSURANCE: THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN RISK POOLING AND MORAL HAZARD 31 (RAND
CORP. 1989).
118. Another organization that faces the combined common pool and moral hazard
problems is the FDIC. Cf. George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank
Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 23–24 (1996). The FDIC, though, has extraordinary powers to
investigate and even assume control over insured banks—powers we assume no participating
state would agree to grant to a federal or interstate agency.
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analyze methods for preserving the funds until genuine fiscal emergencies arise.
We expect that deposit and withdrawal devices could be mixed and matched to find
the most appealing combinations. As we have already noted, the existing literature
on RDFs provides little basis for certainty regarding the causes of RDF
underutilization; it would thus be premature for us to argue definitively in favor of
or against any given instrument or combination of instruments. Therefore, the
analysis that follows should be regarded as tentative and suggestive.
A. Mandates Versus Incentives
We begin by offering a brief explanation for why we believe that any federal
policy in support of state RDFs should take the form of incentives rather than a
mandate for states to save.119 Although we recognize that the difference between
these two approaches is more one of degree than of kind, we believe that outright
mandates have significant costs that are unlikely to be outweighed by the benefits
they might offer.
Perhaps most obviously, a federally imposed obligation to maintain RDF
balances of a certain size would make it difficult to preserve the diversity benefits
of federalism.120 Citizens of different states may have varying preferences for
financial risk-taking and for the timing of their consumption, implying that some
states may wish to save more than others.121 Similarly, the size of the budget buffer
a state needs depends on how much the state expects to spend in the future and the
volatility of the state’s revenue streams.122 States that prefer to spend little, or those
with revenue structures that do not exhibit much cyclical variability, would need to
save relatively less than those with larger expenditure obligations or revenue
sources that drop dramatically in a downturn. Drilling down further still, the
optimal size of a RDF for any given state may vary based on the likelihood of
premature raids, a factor that is likely to depend on the political institutions and
culture of the state.123
We doubt a federal mandate could do nearly as good a job incorporating this
variation as state regulations (if properly motivated) could. Even if the federal
mandate were structured to allow for local variation, federal regulators will likely
lack information about details such as citizen risk preferences, state officials’
expectations about future spending, or state political culture.124 Regulators could

119. Cf. Gamage, supra note 14, at 766 (noting possibility of an “administrative agency
requiring surplus revenues to be invested in rainy day funds”).
120. For general discussions of the diversity benefits of decentralized policy-making, see
PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17–19, 25–26 (1995); Robert P. Inman &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE 73, 83–85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal
Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1122–23 (1999).
121. See Wagner & Elder, supra note 16, at 461; Wolkoff, supra note 45, at 59.
122. See Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, Rainy Day Funds and Value at Risk, ST. TAX
NOTES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 563, 564–66; Joyce, supra note 62, at 68–77.
123. Cf. Wagner & Sobel, supra note 63, at 187 (noting that state fiscal institutions
influence how states spend revenues).
124. Cf. Ben Lockwood, Inter-Regional Insurance, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1999)
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not expect to get reliable information from state partners because, as we have
already explained, the state officials’ incentives would be to save as little as
possible. Partnering with state bureaucrats, who might be somewhat more attuned
to the state’s long-term interests, could improve the reliability of the information
exchanged but would also likely reduce its quality, as the bureaucrats are, by
definition, relatively remote from citizen preferences.125 Moreover, states are
powerful lobbyists on their own behalf, so allowing for variation might simply
open the door to states pushing the effect of any savings mandate down to
meaningless levels.126
Another problem with a direct mandate is the likelihood that it would distort
state decisions. A mandate to save is effectively a tax on state revenues. As it is
well known, taxes can reduce economic efficiency by changing people’s
behavior.127 For instance, if only states are required to save, state governments
might shift revenues and programs to the local level or to quasi-governmental
entities, such as schools and universities, that can raise money through fees rather
than taxes subject to the savings requirement. If the mandate is broadened to
include these substitutes, still others might appear; for example, residents might
simply vote to lower taxes and form private associations, such as charities or gated
communities, to escape the mandate.128 Even if no substitution at all were possible,
voters might simply spend less overall—or perhaps would spend the same amount
but tax themselves more, depending on the relative influence of the income and
substitution effects of the tax.129
(claiming that central government will never have information about local preferences and
policies that is accurate enough to prevent moral hazard). Information is a problem even for
the task of properly motivating states since, in theory, any federal encouragement like a
subsidy should be set so that the state will save the optimal amount. See Gamage, supra note
14, at 766 (noting informational problems in design of RDFs). For this reason, several of our
proposals emphasize opportunities for the federal government to reveal information about
state preferences, as we will explain.
125. See RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM
AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 2–8 (1994) (discussing incentive structure of administrative officials).
126. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 861,
866–67 (1998) (examining the power of intergovernmental lobbying).
127. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 280 (5th ed. 1989). For example, suppose the Dude wants to open a
conventional bowling alley. Conventional bowling is taxed but candlepin isn’t. One possible
outcome is that the Dude simply abides: he opens a conventional bowling alley and pays the
tax. But he might also switch to candlepin. In that case, he is bummed, and the government
also raises no additional tax revenue. The Dude’s bummer is a pure loss of utility for no
offsetting gain, also known as a “deadweight loss.” Id. at 284.
128. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519 (1982) (arguing that private associations can be substitutes for local government);
Brian Galle, The Distortionary Effects of Subsidies for Charity in a Federal System (Jan. 12,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (modeling tradeoff between local government and private
substitutes).
129. The “substitution effect” of the mandate refers to the fact that for any voter,
spending a dollar on state spending will buy less than spending that same dollar somewhere
else because a portion is wasted (from the voter’s present-biased perspective). On the other
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In similar debates about the best form of regulatory tools for environmental
regulation, commentators sometimes argue that mandates (as opposed to less
coercive tools, such as incentives) provide greater certainty of outcomes at least.130
If the regulator wants to achieve a certain amount of reduction in emissions, or a
certain savings target, she simply sets that as the requirement and does not have to
guess about the market’s response to an incentive.131 We think this overestimates
the certainty of mandates and underestimates the flexibility of incentives. The
actual outcome of a mandate regime depends on enforcement efforts, lobbying, and
court battles. Setting a target does not mean states will hit it. And incentive-based
tools can be continually fine-tuned or even set in advance to vary, depending on
market response.132
One clear advantage we do see for a mandate is that, if designed as a percentage
of revenues, it is inherently counter-cyclical. That is, as revenues increase, a
percent-of-revenues mandate would require states to save more.133 When revenues
decline, however, this form of mandate would demand less savings (or permit
distributions). This design is appealing because such “automatic” adjustments
eliminate the cost and delay that come with manual changes.134
Notwithstanding this minor advantage, the preferred approach in our view
would be to adjust the incentives of state-level actors so that they can use their
superior information to set the optimal level of savings for their jurisdiction. Since
both voters and officials may be biased against savings, we consider instruments
for attuning the incentives of each group in turn.
B. Voter Incentives
As noted in Part II, one possible explanation for the underutilization of state
RDFs is that voters simply favor current spending (or reduced taxes) over the
diffuse future benefits of budget stability that RDFs are designed to promote. Our
first proposal for reaching individual voters, though, targets not voters themselves
hand, the mandate makes the voter subjectively poorer. Some goods are more or less
desirable depending on income, which is the phenomenon we refer to when we say “income
effect.” So if state spending is an “inferior good,” meaning it is more attractive when income
is lower, then the mandate could increase taxes. But most data indicate that government
spending instead is a “normal” good for which demand increases with income, and so we
expect that the mandate would depress state spending. See, e.g., Daniel Hewitt, Demand for
National Public Goods: Estimates from Surveys, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 487, 496 (1985).
130. See William A. Pizer, Choosing Price or Quantity Controls for Greenhouse Gases,
in CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY 99, 99 (Michael A. Toman ed., 2001); Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon
Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3,
36, 46 (2009).
131. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 130, at 46.
132. See Louis Kaplow, Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 16268, 2010).
133. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
88–89 (5th ed. 1991) (defining countercyclical spending).
134. See Christina D. Romer, Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations, J.
ECON. PERSP. Spring 1999, at 23, 37 (finding historical evidence that automatic stabilizers
were more effective than discretionary stimulus).
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but instead political “entrepreneurs” and other intermediaries who connect the
public to their elected representatives. To explain why that is so, we must first
sketch the difficulties that any subsidy intended for individuals would face, and
then we detail the mechanisms we think those difficulties require. We then go on to
describe tools for reaching voters qua voters, using the lessons of behavioral
economics as building blocks.
1. Translating Preferences into Politics
Although local voter preferences may be a root cause of the RDF problem, it is
uncertain whether federal incentives targeted specifically at those voters could be
effective. As a general rule, individual voters are rationally ignorant about their
state’s fiscal decisions, preferring to free ride on the efforts of others.135 Thus,
political intermediaries, such as entrepreneurs and interest groups, do much of the
work in transmitting latent public preferences to officials.136 Any intervention
designed to alter individual preferences will likely succeed only if voters’ more
benign attitudes towards savings can be translated up through these same channels.
Historically, direct payments to individuals have motivated those voters to take
political action, notwithstanding the possibility of rational apathy. Political
scientists have documented the power of a cash stream in galvanizing
intermediaries to whip together the political efforts of the beneficiaries.137 Even if
there is not an interest group in place before the grant is awarded, the receipt of the
funds makes the selected beneficiaries a discrete and identifiable group;
entrepreneurs or officials themselves then can organize the group in order to extract
rewards or “rents” from it in exchange for preserving the flow of money.138 Our
own earlier investigations into payouts to voters found some support for this story:
states where taxpayers enjoy a larger federal subsidy via the deduction for state and
local taxes (“SALT”) typically spend more, suggesting that a federal subsidy
directed at individuals influences state fiscal behavior.139
Entrepreneurs and other intermediaries also may be more concerned about longterm fiscal health than individual voters. The leader of a given interest group is not
likely concerned about a state’s fiscal standing as a whole because, from the

135. Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103,
103–04, 107–08 (1990).
136. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 49–56
(1998); Richard E. Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article,
1 PUB. CHOICE 161, 164–67 (1966) (reviewing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)).
137. See Stansel & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 436.
138. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 518–19, 547 (1998); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). Rents can also
be extracted from private contractors who are hired to implement the grant program. Daniel
L. Hatcher, Poverty Revenue: The Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 675,
709–13 (2010).
139. See Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 223–35.
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perspective of any one interest group, the overall budget represents a common pool;
stability is still a public good.140 However, the internal rules of the intermediary
organization can be structured to give its managers incentives to care about the
long-term health of the organization.141 Nonprofit managers, for example, typically
have very long tenure in office and derive much of their compensation from
reputation and personal satisfaction rather than from a share of profits.142 Thus,
their own success is tied to the continuing vitality of the entity and its
constituents.143
At the same time, the literature demonstrates that exit pressures limit the power
of beneficiaries of government payouts. A state or local-level entitlement program,
even one that receives federal matching money, might be costly for relatively
wealthier residents, whose threat to leave if the program grew too expensive would
be a serious concern for local officials.144 And federally supported programs might
draw newcomers who would then be entitled to other local programs with smaller
subsidies (such as education), which could also drive away higher earners.145 The
combination of these factors is thought to hold down state enthusiasm for
redistributive programs, perhaps even those with large federal matching
components, such as Medicaid.146

140. An exception might be leaders of those special interests that benefit
disproportionately from public spending, and who would therefore be unable to free ride on
the stability-defending efforts of others. Teachers’ and other public-employees’ unions seem
plausible candidates here.
141. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, The Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 318–21 (1983) (describing how internal structure of
nonprofits aligns incentives of managers with those of other stakeholders).
142. See Bruce R. Kingma, Public Good Theories of the Non-Profit Sector: Weisbrod
Revisited, 8 VOLUNTAS 135, 142 (1997) (arguing that employee control over the
organization's mission and services explains empirical evidence of lower wages in the
nonprofit sector). For a more developed discussion of the motivations of nonprofit
employees, see Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity 23–60 (November 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with University of Georgia School of Law).
143. Cf. Bengt Holmström, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66
REV. ECON. STUDIES 169, 169–82 (1999) (modeling claim that individual’s desire for
developing their career can align with interests of firm).
144. See Stark, supra note 52, at 1408–10.
145. See Edward M. Gramlich & Deborah S. Laren, Migration and Income
Redistribution Responsibilities, 19 J. HUM. RESOURCES 489, 510 (1984); Paul E. Peterson &
Mark Rom, American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and Residential Choices, 83 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 711, 725 (1989).
146. See Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and
Evidence, 66 S. ECON. J. 505, 505–25 (2000) (finding some evidence for this effect in
welfare spending); Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the
Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 352, 352–36 (2002) (also finding some
evidence for this effect in welfare spending); Reagan Baughman & Jeffrey Milyo, How Do
States Formulate Medicaid and SCHIP Policy? Economic and Political Determinants of
State Eligibility Levels 15–17 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/2393/HowStatesFormulateMe
dicaid.pdf?sequence=1 (finding some evidence that state Medicaid policy is influenced by
generosity of neighbors).
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Accordingly, an important empirical question in the design of an effective rainyday subsidy is the effect of exit pressures on state savings behavior. If exit appears
to play a large role in creating pressure to spend immediately, then incentives
targeted generally at all voters will likely have only limited effectiveness. On the
flip side, incentives targeted specifically at the most mobile citizens might be
especially cost-effective.
It may be surprising that state political parties have not already developed as
intermediaries for state fiscal health. In theory, the parties are repeat players that
could benefit from reputations for fiscal prudence. The problem, apparently, is that
modern parties are largely organized and identified according to nationally salient
issues.147 As a result, at the state level parties do not tend to compete on the basis of
local policy outcomes.148
Another targeting issue our analysis raises is that if intermediaries are the
critical link between voters and state policy, it might be argued that incentives
should be aimed not at voters but at the intermediaries themselves. We think this is
a possibility, but the available evidence suggests it might not be a long-term
solution. The literature on federal grants suggests that local officials understand
how to buy off interest groups in order to obtain their support. For example, when
the federal government awards a targeted block grant to a state (rather than directly
to the individuals within the state), state officials often will choose to spend a
significant fraction of the grant on the targeted purpose, even though there are no
genuinely effective legal enforcement mechanisms for requiring them to do so.149
Commentators argue that, much as in the direct grant story, this may be evidence
that officials are using the grant dollars to develop and curry favor with the interest
group that will lobby for additional federal dollars.150 Some studies have found,
though, that this process is relatively short-lived; it may be that as competing
interest groups learn about the available funds, they lobby for directing the money
elsewhere.151

147. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. POL. 419, 448–59 (2007) (explaining this
phenomenon in the context of municipal government).
148. Brian Schaffner, Matthew Streb & Gerald Wright, Teams Without Uniforms: The
Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q., 7, 19–22 (2001); Melinda
Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy:Probing the Myths of Judicial
Reform,95 AMER. POL. SCI. Rev. 315, 329 (2001).
149. E.g., Katherine Baicker, Government Decision-Making and the Incidence of Federal
Mandates, 82 J. PUB. ECON. 147, 177–78 (2001); Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The Overspending
and Flypaper Effects of Fiscal Illusion: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 44 J. URB. ECON. 1,
15–22 (1998).
150. Sang-Seok Bae & Richard C. Feiock, The Flypaper Effect Revisited:
Intergovernmental Grants and Local Governance, 27 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 577, 583–85
(2004); Radu Filimon, Thomas Romer & Howard Rosentahl, Asymmetric Information and
Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly Power in Public Spending, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 51, 52
(1982).
151. Nora Gordon, Do Federal Grants Boost School Spending? Evidence from Title I, 88
J. PUB. ECON. 1771, 1773 (2004); Byron Lutz, Taxation with Representation:
Intergovernmental Grants in a Plebiscite Democracy, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 316, 323–24
(2010).
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2. Subsidized Lockboxes
These observations about intermediaries lead us to suggest that the most
effective mechanism for deflecting present bias among voters might be subsidized,
federally enforced lockboxes. In public finance lingo, a “lockbox” is usually a pool
of money that is set aside under state law for use for a particular purpose, such as
education or policing.152 As part of a rainy-day subsidy program, the federal
government could permit a fraction of the subsidy to be set aside in these dedicated
accounts, to be reserved for targeted future spending. Both targeted and untargeted
subsidies would be contingent on the state meeting other criteria, such as the
withdrawal mechanisms we will discuss in Part IV.
The strength of this approach is that it leverages state officials’ political acumen,
allowing them to target dollars where they will be most effective. That is, if state
officials share the federal commitment to long-term stability (either because that is
their own preference or because additional funds are used to change their
incentives—about which more will be discussed shortly), they could use
contributions to these boxes, bolstered by federal money, to buy off those interest
groups who would otherwise demand immediate spending. Local officials have
superior information about who those groups are. While the reduced flexibility of
the locked-up funds would somewhat reduce their efficacy,153 the fact that they are
reserved for the future would be a significant advance over current practices, in
which state funds are allocated to interest groups for immediate use.154
Lockboxes also help to overcome the problem that grant-related buy-outs are
sometimes short-lived. Again, studies suggest that lobbying by other interest
groups may in time overwhelm the targeting of a federal grant.155 When moneys are
legally committed to a fund, though, they of course become harder to divert. In
other grant situations, there is also a danger of offsetting cuts: officials leave grant
moneys in place, but slash other forms of benefits to the targeted group in order to
satisfy demands by others.156 But there is a zero lower bound on offsetting cuts: if
the grant funds are the only source of spending for the targeted groups, there is
obviously nowhere else to offset.157 That is largely the case with rainy-day funds:
savings in most jurisdictions are so low that it is unlikely that lockbox funds could
be fully offset by cuts in other savings programs.158
The security of lockbox funds also increases their efficacy in buying off interest
groups by making it more certain that the promised benefits are actually delivered.

152. Alasdair Roberts, Lockbox Government: Segregated Funding Strategies and the
Decline of Governmental Flexibility, 15 GOVERNANCE 241, 251–52 (2002).
153. Id. at 259.
154. Cf. Douglas & Gaddie, supra note 16, at 23, 26–28 (finding that multiple specialpurpose funds are more difficult to raid than a single pool).
155. See Roberts, supra note 152.
156. Gordon, supra note 151, at 1772–73.
157. Cf. Richard Steinberg, Does Government Spending Crowd Out Donations?
Interpreting the Evidence, 62 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 591, 591 (1991) (noting
that government expenditures increase total spending on a good when private spending is
zero).
158. See Gonzalez & Levinson, supra note 9; Gonzalez & Paqueo, supra note 9;
Marlowe, supra note 9; Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 9; Super, supra note 4.
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In practice, the fastenings that bind lockbox dollars to their targets are notoriously
easy to unwind, because the state legislature can usually easily amend or bypass the
lockbox conditions.159 Even when conditions are hard to change, few have been
held to be meaningfully judicially enforceable.160 However, if a federal official, or
other neutral third party, holds the keys to the box instead, then the commitment to
spend the targeted funds is far more credible.
3. Other Individually Targeted Payments
If incentives aimed at intermediaries prove unworkable or politically unsavory,
subsidies for rainy-day funds could of course always be paid directly to voters.
Again, one might expect that rationally ignorant voters are unlikely to connect a
check they receive in June from the federal government with their support in
November for state officials who made the right decision about an obscure state
budget line.161 Some evidence (including our own) suggests, though, that these
mechanisms do have some influence on policy outcomes, probably because they
indirectly shape the influence and behavior of political intermediaries.162
With some modifications, an RDF subsidy could follow the pattern of other
successful efforts, for example by increasing the federal deductibility of state tax
payments that go toward RDF contributions. Simply expanding the current federal
tax deduction for state and local taxes would not be ideal, though, because of the
interaction of that provision with the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).163 The
AMT disallows the SALT deduction for taxpayers subject to AMT liability, and the
likelihood of AMT liability increases with income.164 In effect, the AMT makes the
SALT deduction more valuable as income declines and vice versa. That is a good
result when the goal is to induce states to spend more during recessions. But it is a
bad outcome if the goal is to get them to save. States should be saving more when
their income increases, and an RDF subsidy that relied on the AMT-limited SALT
deduction would have the opposite effect. But this could be remedied by amending
the AMT to allow bonus deductions for a state’s RDF contributions. If that were

159. Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 55, 67–69
(2006). For evidence, see Calvin Blackwell, John C. Crotts, Stephen W. Litvin & Alan K.
Styles, Local Government Compliance with Earmarked Tax Regulation, 34 PUB. FIN. REV.
212, 213–28 (2006).
160. However, budgeting rules and other structural mechanisms can give legislators
incentives to respect dedicated funds. ERIC M. PATASHNIK, PUTTING TRUST IN THE U.S.
BUDGET: FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS AND THE POLITICS OF COMMITMENT 31–32 (2000); Garrett,
supra note 138, at 567–68 (suggesting that budget rules create opportunities for
congressional deliberation and public influence).
161. See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 487 (1996) (suggesting that existing
federal efforts to support higher state taxes may suffer this problem).
162. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 223–35.
163. I.R.C. §§ 55–58. For an overview of the AMT’s complex provisions, see STAFF OF
THE J. COMM., 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE INDIVIDUAL
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE 1–6
(Comm. Print 2007), available at www.jct.gov/x-38-07.pdf.
164. For a complete explanation, see Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 210–23.
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done, we would have the standard case in which deductions are more valuable as
the taxpayer’s income rises, resulting in stronger incentives to save as the state’s
economy improves and average income increases.165
Whether or not policy makers rely on bonus deductibility, any individually
targeted subsidy should attempt to economize on the federal dollars expended by
focusing on critical individuals. For example, if the evidence supports the view that
discontented homeowners are especially influential in states’ savings behavior, then
subsidies would be most cost effective if they were disproportionately slanted to
the benefit of those homeowners. Perhaps the subsidy could take the form of a
federal credit against local property taxes. In addition to reaching a politically
important population, a property tax credit could leverage the high salience and
considerable unpopularity of property taxes: relief from the property tax would
appear more valuable than the equivalent dollar value devoted to unnoticed and
relatively acceptable levies, such as the sales tax.166
Other than property owners, though, it is hard to predict which individual voters
are key to obstructing state savings, which implies that an effective targeting
mechanism would have to induce voters to reveal their “type,” that is, whether or
not they are biased against savings. The goal would be to produce a “separating
equilibrium” in which the incentive itself is only appealing to those who are present
-biased, so that the people who accept it are necessarily those who would have been
most resistant to savings.167 For instance, suppose that the incentive payment is a
small fraction of the state’s per capita savings, but that the voter can access it
immediately, such as through a debit card, rather than having to wait until the
following April to claim a tax refund.168 Alternative uses of the state’s money
would benefit the voter only after some delay: police and teachers must be hired
and their services parceled out over time, and even cash benefit checks are typically
spread across the year. A highly impatient voter would discount these future

165. See Yair Listokin, The Income Tax Code at War with Fiscal Policy: Why Tax
Scholars Can No Longer Ignore Macroeconomics 25 (Yale Program for Studies in Law,
Econ., & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 378, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372782.
166. See Richard L. Cole & John Kincaid, Public Opinion and American Federalism:
Perspectives on Taxing, Spending, and Trust—An ACIR Update, 30 PUBLIUS 189, 190–95
(2000) (reporting voter attitudes toward different tax instruments); Wallace E. Oates, On the
Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL
FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65, 65–66 (Geoffrey Brennan, Bhajan
S. Grewal & Peter Groenewegen eds., 1988) (noting that economists assume that visibility of
a tax affects political attitudes toward it).
167. A “separating equilibrium” is one in which sellers split the market for a product into
two or more segments by offering differing bundles of prices and quantities of that product.
By choosing a particular bundle, consumers reveal information about their preferences to the
seller. For a more complete explanation, see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 630–38 (1976).
168. Cf. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 178–79 (2008) (suggesting use of “smart”
cards for delivery of tax rebates).

2012]

BEYOND BAILOUTS

629

services relative to the immediate payment and hence would happily accept the
immediate payment.
Subsidies that induce voters to reveal their type might save money in at least
two ways. First, since the impatient voter has a much higher discount rate than the
market rate of interest, the accelerated rebate allows the payor to offer a subsidy of
considerably less than the amount the state will contribute to the RDF. Second, the
discounted payment helps to reduce the extent to which subsidies would flow to
inframarginal voters—those who would be willing to support RDF contributions
even without a subsidy.169 Those with more patience would not find the small
present payment a worthwhile substitute for benefits that are delayed only a
relatively short time, but presumably these voters would also be less opposed to
savings. Admittedly, though, not all voters who are present-biased in their
preferences for state spending are also present-biased in their personal finances, and
so alternative targeting mechanisms might be needed to further separate out the
electorate.
C. Official Incentives
1. Matching Contributions to State Funds
An alternative (and more direct) method of building state RDF balances is for
the federal government to match state contributions. Matching grants create a
substitution effect: each dollar of savings costs the state only a fraction of a dollar,
making savings a bargain compared to other choices.170 As we have explained, one
reason state officials may fail to contribute adequately to RDFs is because officials
excessively discount the value of having future fiscal security. The substitution
effect of the matching grant helps to counterbalance this present bias.
At the same time, the very fact that matching contributions can only benefit the
state in the future may make direct grants to an RDF a relatively inefficient use of
federal money. Again, the only benefits a present official gains from federal
payments to her RDF are the possibility of future fiscal solvency and perhaps a
lower immediate cost of borrowed funds. And deferring funds into the future might
adversely play into the hands of political rivals.171 So each matching dollar the RDF

169. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919,
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 36 (2009), available at
http://pppnet.org/pdf/R40919.pdf (explaining that government subsidies for production of
public goods often are paid to those who would buy the good anyway).
170. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 35–37 (3d ed. 2010). Thus,
matching grants outperform block grants as a method for changing state behavior. In contrast
to a matching grant, block grants may simply crowd out deposits the state would have made
anyway. That is, if I plan to save $100 of my allowance money toward a bicycle, and my
Aunt Petunia gives me $50 to put in the bank, my rational response is to deposit Petunia’s
$50, save $50 of my own, and then spend the extra $50.
Block grants also strongly resemble a simple federal savings pool in that their size is
largely uncontrolled by states, leading to the federalism and moral hazard problems we
discussed in Part II, supra.
171. See Wagner, supra note 45.
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receives is also discounted by present officials, diminishing the substitution effect
of the match.
A better “matching” grant to overcome political present bias might be
unrestricted payouts to states that make their own contributions to a qualifying
RDF. This instrument resembles the traditional “IRA” many workers use to save
for retirement: it grants an immediate benefit—in the case of the IRA, a deduction
from the present year’s taxes—in exchange for the taxpayer’s willingness to defer
consumption until age fifty-nine and a half.172 Early withdrawals are generally
subject to a 10% penalty.173 Another form of retirement savings, the “Roth IRA,”
offers no present savings; both forms of IRA allow savers to defer tax on any gains
in the money invested until it is spent.174 Relative to the Roth IRA, the traditional
IRA helps to encourage workers whose present bias would make them indifferent
to the value of deferral to nonetheless make contributions.175
In much the same way, a present grant to states based on their RDF
contributions would be disproportionately valuable to present-biased officials.
Further, since the value to present officials of higher RDF balances, even if heavily
discounted, is still likely to be more than zero, the federal grant could be less than
dollar for dollar and still be effective. Of course, funds granted immediately need
not be devoted to counter-cyclical spending, and so the immediate grant is less
efficient in that sense.
Just as with individual retirement incentives, it might be beneficial for the
federal government to offer both forms of matching grants and allow states to
reveal their “type” by opting into one or the other. Immediate matching payments
could have a lower discounted present value than federal contributions directly to
an RDF. By definition, present-biased officials view deferred consumption as
costlier than the market rate of interest, so they will prefer the immediate payment,
as we have just outlined. Other jurisdictions, however, may be only weakly presentbiased, so that the direct-to-RDF payments will have a higher present value and
might be sufficient to trigger savings. That would allow both the state and federal
funds to be devoted to the RDF, increasing the cost-effectiveness of the subsidy. By
observing state responses and calibrating the payment ratios of the two programs,
federal administrators could help to trim the amount of money spent unnecessarily

172. I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(A) (2006).
173. Id. § 72(q).
174. Ordinarily, transferring funds from one investment vehicle to another would result
in an immediate tax, Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559–62 (1991),
but IRAs escape this treatment as long as the transfer is to another IRA. INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PUBLICATION 590: INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 22–23 (2011).
Roth distributions are actually entirely tax-free in most cases. Id. at 64.
175. Richard H. Thaler, Psychology & Savings Policy, 84 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PROC. 186, 188 (1994).
Despite this, IRA enrollments are surprisingly low, INV. CO. INST., THE IRA
INVESTOR PROFILE: TRADITIONAL IRA INVESTORS’ CONTRIBUTION ACTIVITY, 2007 AND 2008,
at 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_10_ira_contributions.pdf, perhaps
because the effort of choosing either plan itself takes on exaggerated cost, Ted O’Donoghue
& Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL
DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 125, 140–52 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999).
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to overcome present bias: the central government could offer increasingly steeply
discounted present payments, but use the alternative of undiscounted direct
contributions to the RDF as a backstop to ensure that states will still save.
Direct contributions to RDFs do have one other possible advantage over simple
cash transfers, but it is not overwhelming. Directing funds to a state’s RDF allows
the federal government to defer its own payments until the time that the state
actually would withdraw its funds176—just as a bank account is really only a
promise by the bank to pay on demand, so that the bank is free to use the money
elsewhere until the depositor demands it. This is advantageous to the customer
because the bank has better investment opportunities than the individual depositor,
and therefore can afford to pay out some of the superior return in the form of
interest payments. Similarly, if the federal government can make better use of the
RDF contribution in the time between the state’s contribution and its desired
withdrawal, then leaving the funds in the general federal treasury increases the total
funds available to both. But this strategy poses both political and economic risks.
For one, Congress could renege on its promise to pay. Even if the federal promise
is somehow insulated from political pressures, the strategy is economically risky,
because a state’s later demand for RDF funds may coincide with a national
downturn. That will make it more difficult for the federal government to make
good on its contribution; moreover, if the withdrawing state is relatively insulated
from the national recession, federal funds would be better channeled to those harder
hit.
2. Let States “Save More Tomorrow”
Another possible approach to overcoming official present bias would be to turn
it against itself. This bit of fiscal jujitsu is inspired by Benartzi, Thaler, and
Sunstein’s work on designing incentives for individuals to save for retirement.
Individuals who are excessively present-biased are likely to save too little to pay
for their needs later in life.177 Benartzi, Thaler and Sunstein suggest, among other
possibilities, that present-bias can be flipped to actually encourage savings through
their “Save More Tomorrow” Plan.178 Under the plan, workers agree with their
employers that they will contribute a portion of their paychecks toward retirement,
but also that contributions will not start until some later date, such as when the

176. That is, the matching grant paid by the federal government could take the form of a
promissory note to pay a sum certain upon demand, if the state meets other withdrawal
conditions.
177. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 175, at 140. To remind the reader, these
individuals may be “hyperbolic” discounters: they value present consumption too much, and
later consumption too little, relative to the valuation they would have given in a more
objective state. In addition to the political effects we have described, this form of present
bias also discourages personal savings, since savings is simply the exchange of present for
future consumption. Id.
178. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 114–17; Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H.
Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
2007, at 81, 100.
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worker gets her next raise.179 Because the pain of savings is deferred into the future,
it too is subject to a high degree of discounting, making the difference between
discounted costs and benefits far narrower than “normal” for the hyperbolic
discounter—enough so that workers offered the Save More Tomorrow Plan in
Benartzi and Thaler’s study joined in numbers far exceeding those who participated
in traditional retirement plans.180
We propose a similar mechanism translated to state budgeting. In order to claim
its federal subsidy, a state would have to commit to make future contributions to a
qualifying RDF. Benartzi and Thaler attribute the success of their plan to
psychological factors such as inertia and excessive risk aversion, but we think it
also follows from the logic of present bias. Precommitment flips the usual timediscounting factors: an official can claim immediate rewards, such as credit for
fiscal responsibility and an improved bond rating.181 But these rewards do not
require the official to give up any spending on current projects. The price will have
to be paid in the future, but by then the official may be out of office—or, even
better, the cost will do political harm to her rivals/successors. The fact that the costs
of savings will be discounted makes enrolling in the project more appealing for the
official, just as with the individual saver.182
At the same time, from the federal government’s perspective, not much is lost
by allowing the state to defer tending to its RDF nest egg. The goal of the program
is long-term stability. Deferral increases the chances that RDF funds will be
inadequate if the next crisis arrives soon, but our aim is not truly the next crisis but
rather all the crises that will follow. The grant maker will have to enforce the state’s
promise, but that will have to be done annually for any RDF subsidy scheme once
payments have begun.
The Save More Tomorrow Plan also creates additional flexibility in the forms of
the subsidies the federal government can offer. The promise of future performance
can be bought with any combination of unrestricted or RDF-matching grants, both
of which could be either paid immediately or deferred until actual deposits are
made. We expect that immediate, unrestricted grants would be especially cost
effective in this setting because of the timing mismatch between the official’s use
of the money (now) and costs (later). Further, by allowing jurisdictions to choose
their subsidy the federal government can again sort among those of different time

179. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 115.
180. Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 178, at 100–01. We note, though, that Benartzi and
Thaler do not discuss whether the effect they observe is due to precommitment, or if instead
higher savings are simply the result of forcing employees to think about retirement. Cf. John
Ameriks, Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to Plan,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1007 (2003) (finding that discussing retirement increased household
savings).
181. Of course, bond ratings will only likely improve immediately if the state’s
commitment to make future payments is credible. We will address that question
momentarily.
182. Cf. Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn:
A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 28–29 (2010)
(suggesting that government’s precommitment to future energy tax would make that tax
more politically palatable).
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discounts, and with four different instruments rather than only two, the grant maker
can tune even more carefully to eliminate excess payments.
Allowing for payments in advance of performance does add an enforcement
wrinkle. Once the federal funder has invested in the RDF contract, the states will
have an opportunity to “hold up” the federal government, either reneging entirely
on their commitment to save or bargaining for more favorable terms.183 A common
remedy for this hold-up problem in contract law is to give the party that must await
performance the power to impose fairly draconian costs on the counterparty if they
fail to perform.184 In this case, depending on the structure of the enforcement
mechanism, it could be adequate to allow the federal government to penalize the
state in an amount approximating the amount the state is obliged to save, rather
than clawing back the full amount of any subsidies to date. For example, the
subsidy agreement could provide that nonperformance will be penalized through
reduced federal contributions for other valuable, discretionary state programs, such
as highway dollars. As long as the expected penalty amount would cost future
legislators as much as the net cost of savings—the present cost minus discounted
future benefit—they will have incentives to comply with their commitment.
3. Competitive Rankings
Finally, competitive rankings by a neutral evaluator may be a cost-effective
alternative to cash payments for rewarding officials. As we noted earlier, one
reason officials may fail to internalize the future benefits of fiscal prudence is that
their constituents cannot easily observe and reward such behavior.185 Further, if
voters cannot easily verify the trustworthiness of their officials, they might
rationally prefer tax cuts to savings during booms. If most public spending is going
to be wasted by self-serving officials in any event, the optimal strategy might well
be to simply minimize taxes.186 Thus, providing some assurances of official
responsibility is important to the incentives of both officials and voters.
Many officials might claim to be saving prudently, but talk is cheap.187 No
individual voter would rationally try to verify such a claim, unless she had endless
free time and a real passion for studying fiscal volatility and the minutiae of the

183. See Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA
741, 749–73 (1999) (reviewing literature on opportunities for party to “hold up” contractual
counter-parties).
184. See Steven Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 334–48 (2007). There is also a large amount of economics literature exploring other
solutions. See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the
Value of Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (1999); Abraham L. Wickelgren, The
Limitations of Buyer-Option Contracts in Solving the Holdup Problem, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 127 (2007).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
186. See Alberto Alesina, Filipe R. Campante & Guido Tabellini, Why Is Fiscal Policy
Often Procyclical?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1006, 1032–33 (2008).
187. See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1996, at 103, 105–17 (discussing instances in which claims are likely to be credible, and
noting that costless claims, if believed, would benefit one side to the detriment of the other).
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state’s budget.188 Credible verification arrives only long afterwards, when the
state’s budget either crumbles under the pressure of recessions—or survives.
Federal officials could overcome this information deficit by rating the
performance of local officials.189 To give voters a sense of whether their own
officials’ performance is above or below average, and to spur inter-jurisdictional
competition, the ratings should actually be rankings: each jurisdiction, and perhaps
each official, could be ranked according to the prudence of their RDF decisions.190
Evidence suggests that voters do use the fiscal performance of neighboring
jurisdictions, where available, to judge their own officials, so this mechanism
would not be a novelty; it would simply provide better, and more credible,
comparative data.191
To be sure, the optimal amount of RDF savings will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Any scoring system would have to take into account a state’s actual
savings needs before judging whether officials have made progress toward those
targets. More generally, different groups of citizens may have differing risk
preferences, a factor that is hard to capture with any single index. Dorf and Sabel
have proposed to deal with this problem (albeit not in the fiscal context
specifically) through a system of rolling benchmarking, in which localities and
citizens can participate in the design of the evaluation system, and they can finetune it over time to produce results most useful to their decisions.192 Even if this
sort of mechanism is not fully effective, we think a certain degree of
“nationalization” of the rankings is useful. States do not take account of
externalities in determining how much risk is appropriate; if the rankings are a tool
for achieving efficient levels of savings, they should at least partly reflect national
welfare, not simply state’s subjective preferences.
IV. WITHDRAWAL MECHANISMS
As we mentioned earlier, studies show that states not only struggle to deposit
enough money into their RDFs, but also tend to withdraw funds before true crises.

188. See Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a
Model of Monetary Policy, 12 J. MONETARY ECON. 101 (1983) (developing the argument
that officials cannot commit credibly to long-term fiscal policy). For example, we note that
even your authors, who are confessedly giant geeks, have never attempted to study whether
their own officials are making adequate RDF contributions.
189. Cf. Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 585–91 (1996)
(suggesting “third-party enforcement” as a solution to low credibility of political promises).
190. We owe this mechanism first to Professors Dorf and Sabel, Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267,
319–23 (1998), and also to Heather Gerken’s notion of electoral-fairness rankings, HEATHER
K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO
FIX IT 108–31 (2009).
191. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and
Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 41 (1995). However, this evidence is not
consistently supported across all data. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions
and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 55–56
(2003) [hereinafter Besley & Case, Policy Choices].
192. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 190, at 318–20.
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Again, early withdrawals are a predictable result of present bias: once the piggy
bank is packed, the temptation to crack it open is strong.193 Accordingly, an
effective federal program must not only get money into an RDF but also keep it
safely there until the time is right. We leave for the work of others the task of
deciding when exactly are the ideal times to release RDF funds.194 Instead, we
focus our attention on the problem of getting officials to implement whatever
optimal spending patterns experts identify. This Part sketches some possibilities.
First, though, we explain why we reject a solution currently in use by some states.
A. Mandatory Replenishment
One tool that several states already use to maintain RDF balances is a mandatory
“replenishment” rule. Mandatory replenishment, as the name implies, obliges the
legislature to repay any funds withdrawn from an RDF, usually over a one- to
three-year period after withdrawal.195 The federal unemployment insurance (UI)
financing system works similarly: states pay for the UI benefits they provide to
their own workers, but they can borrow from a federal pool of money if they run
out.196 However, states must pay back their loans within nine months to avoid
interest charges and within two years to escape federal penalty taxes on state
employers.197 Given the familiarity of the repayment mechanism, it might be a
natural possibility for preserving RDF funds. We think to the contrary, though, that
experience with replenishment rules and UI federal loans shows that the systems
perform poorly.
First, immediate repayment undermines the countercyclical goals of RDFs and
UI programs. As the recent recession demonstrates, a state that is hit hard enough
to need extra funds in one year will often be no better off the next.198 In the past
decade, states that have borrowed from the federal UI fund have had to cut benefits
and raise local taxes to avoid UI penalty taxes, often while still in the throes of

193. See Wagner & Elder, supra note 16, at 445 (“[T]he realization of a budget surplus
also carries with it pressure from constituents and interest groups to increase expenditures or
reduce taxes.”).
194. There is a tradeoff inherent in any decision to spend funds to ease a current
recession. Each dollar spent also potentially reduces funds available for a future recession, in
which government spending might be even more vital. See Zahradnik & Johnson, supra note
5, at 2–4, 10 (suggesting how states should deal with this tradeoff). This is an exercise in
dynamic intertemporal optimization, which economists have studied in other contexts. See
AVINASH K. DIXIT, OPTIMIZATION IN ECONOMIC THEORY (2d ed. 1990).
195. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & KWAME BOADI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
WHY AND HOW STATES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR RAINY DAY FUNDS: RECESSION
HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE OF FUNDS AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS 15 (2011), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-3-11sfp.pdf.
196. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 7–8.
197. Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, supra note 99, at 1.
198. IRIS J. LAV & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TO
AVOID LOOMING TAX INCREASES FOR EMPLOYERS AND LIKELY BENEFIT CUTS FOR
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS, MORATORIUM ON STATE INTEREST PAYMENTS TO FEDERAL UI
TRUST FUND NEEDS TO BE EXTENDED 5 (2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/
cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3179.
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recession.199 Forcing states to make mandatory RDF replenishment payments while
still struggling to meet other basic obligations does not make sense.200
Second, and relatedly, replenishment rules reduce the efficacy of RDFs by
reducing states’ willingness to spend during recessions.201 For a state facing a
funding gap that spans two fiscal years, an RDF with a quick replenishment rule is
the equivalent of shoveling snow from one side of the driveway to the other: the
drift is just as deep, but the shoveler is tired. That is, the state incurs transaction
costs without gaining any meaningful income-smoothing benefits.
Both these problems can be mitigated if the repayment problem is stretched or
deferred until a time when the state’s budget is on a firmer footing. In that case
there is not much difference between a repayment obligation and a more general
incentive to contribute to the RDF. So the central weakness of UI repayment and
mandatory replenishment is that they lack the flexibility to allow states to
contribute only when contributions make fiscal sense.
B. An IRA for States?
Timing is also a significant challenge for another possible withdrawal rule
modeled on existing programs. Individual savers who take advantage of
government incentives to contribute to retirement funds typically must pay a
penalty, usually 10% of the withdrawn funds, if they withdraw before they reach
age fifty-nine and a half.202 The familiarity of the IRA mechanism is useful, since
we have significant data on how individuals respond to its incentive structure.
Accordingly, one tool for maintaining RDF balances might be to define periods of
fiscal need and to penalize withdrawals from the fund outside of those periods.203
The familiarity of the IRA model is the good news; the bad news is that the data
suggest that many households treat their IRAs like a checking account. Early
withdrawals from IRAs are fairly substantial.204 That should not be surprising: a
present-biased household will discount the cost of making the extra withdrawal,
because the household expects to spend the money remaining in the account in the
future.205 We should expect, then, that a tax on “early” spending, however defined,

199. Id. at 4.
200. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 24; Mattoon, supra note
15, at 7.
201. See ROBERT ZAHRADNIK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RAINY DAY FUNDS:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 2 (2005) (stating that replenishment rules discourage states
from using their RDF funds).
202. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 174, at 52.
203. See Stark, supra note 6, at 418–19.
204. Barbara A. Butrica, Sheila R. Zedlewski & Philip Issa, Understanding Early
Withdrawals from Retirement Accounts 2, 30 (Urban Inst. Ret. Policy Program, Discussion
Paper No. 10-02, 2010) (reporting that 3% of IRA assets, or $11 billion, was withdrawn
early in 2005); Gene Amromin & Paul Smith, What Explains Early Withdrawals from
Retirement Accounts? Evidence from a Panel of Taxpayers, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 595, 601
(2003) (reporting $9 billion in early withdrawals in 1996).
205. Cf. Stefano DellaVigna & M. Daniele Paserman, Job Search and Impatience, 23 J.
LAB. ECON. 527, 529 (2005) (finding that impatient unemployed workers invest less effort to
acquire new source of income).
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would be unlikely to deter present-biased jurisdictions from drawing down their
RDF.206
It might be possible to design around the gross-up problem, although the
fungibility of money creates significant challenges. For example, states could be
prohibited from paying any penalty out of RDF funds. But the state could borrow to
cover the cost or pay it out of funds that had been ticketed for infrastructure or
pension contributions, all of which would allow it to trade short-term gain for longterm cost.207 Prior federal attempts to prevent these kinds of offsetting
arrangements, often known as “maintenance of effort” clauses, have generally been
viewed as failures.208
On the other hand, a federal penalty might be effective as a signaling device to
voters, akin to the competitive rankings we described earlier. It would, after all,
amount to an independent judgment that the state’s officials were squandering the
state’s savings. If officials are largely to blame for states’ present-bias, this signal
could chasten those officials by giving credence to their political rivals. As we have
sketched, it is difficult for politicians to claim credibly that they are more fiscally
responsible than their opposition, but that would be rather less true if one side’s
claims have the imprimatur of a neutral third party (assuming the federal official
could herself be seen as genuinely disinterested). Alternately, if voters are the
problem, it is possible that government suggestions about responsible savings

206. Cf. Len E. Burman, Norma B. Coe, Michael Dworsky & William G. Gale, Effects of
Public Policy on the Disposition of Pre-Retirement Lump-Sum Distributions: Rational and
Behavioral Influence 2, 23–24 (CentER, Discussion Paper No. 2008-94, 2008) (attributing
penalizable withdrawals to impatience and salience effects). On the other hand, as Thaler
argues, households may be less inclined to spend IRA funds because they do not think of
them as available for spending. Richard H. Thaler, Psychology & Savings Policy, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 186, 189–90 (1994).
To the extent that the penalty tax is effective in reducing withdrawals by IRA
holders, its operation may owe as much to psychology as finance. Withdrawal triggers
certain burdensome recordkeeping, such as the need to compute and report the additional
tax. Some individuals may avoid withdrawal in order to put off the need to comply with the
corresponding administrative burden. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and
Psychology of Sub-Prime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1119 (2009)
(arguing that low-income households make financial decisions based on size of up-front
transaction costs). But this kind of procrastination behavior does not affect officials as
directly, since they can simply delegate most burdens to others.
207. Although increased borrowing, if large enough, would add to the costs of other debtfinanced projects, reducing but not eliminating the short-term gains.
208. E.g., Alexander Cowell, Dennis McCarty & Albert Woodward, Impact of Federal
Substance Abuse Block Grants on State Substance Abuse Spending: Literature and Data
Review, 6 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y & ECON. 173, 177 (2003); Hills, supra note 118 at 936
n.407. But see Karen Jacobson & Thomas G. McGuire, Federal Block Grants and State
Spending: The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Block Grant and State Agency
Behavior, 21 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 751, 766 (1996) (finding evidence that
increased enforcement of maintenance-of-effort clauses increased state spending). Cowell et
al. critique the Jacobson & McGuire study as having omitted several variables, Cowell et al.,
supra, at 934, and indeed it hard not to notice that Jacobson & McGuire simply assume that
nothing else transpires during the time period when they assert enforcement efforts increase.
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behavior could “nudge” voters in the right direction; that is one interpretation of
Thaler’s findings on programs that by default channel workers into retirement
savings programs.209
As with incentives to save, the penalty could also be more effective if it is aimed
at interest groups, rather than the public as a whole. Here again the UI federal
finance system is a possible precedent. States can set their own UI rules, but they
are subject to some federal guidelines from which they rarely diverge.210 Given the
strong incentives of most state officials to diverge from their rivals, that uniformity
is surprising.211 Surprising, that is, unless one knows that failure to satisfy federal
standards triggers a tax on all state employers equal to about 5% of employee
wages.212 It is highly likely that the threat of angry political blowback from their
business communities has compelled state officials to toe the federal line.213
An RDF penalty system could be designed similarly to the UI system, such as
by collecting the penalty through reduced federal tax deductions for the state’s
corporations. That would leverage the disproportionate political power of mobile
businesses. Since a corporation could presumably avoid a penalty by leaving any
state that had incurred one, the threat of exit by those corporations would put heavy
pressure on officials not to incur the penalty in the first place.214
C. Federal Control
Taking the IRA model one step further, another policy option would be for state
funds to be deposited into an account that would be controlled by federal officials.
States could request payouts, but any withdrawal would have to be approved by the
federal superintendent. We see several tradeoffs in this approach.
Most obviously, granting control to federal officials could largely remove
spending decisions from any state-level pathologies. We say “could” because the
design of the federal program will determine the extent of its political
independence. Members of Congress will typically reflect at least in part the

209. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1181 (2003).
210. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-14, at 279–80 (2000) (noting that all states were in
compliance with federal requirements).
211. See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 912–19
(2008) (describing state official incentives to resist homogenizing federal grants); Robert
Tannenwald, Christopher J. O’Leary & Wei-Jang Huang, New Ways of Evaluating State
Unemployment Insurance, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., March, 1999, at 15, 16 (reporting that
“concerns about economic competitiveness” affect state UI policy).
212. H.R. Rep. No. 106-14, supra note 205, at 280.
213. Cf. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–89 (1937) (rejecting
argument that penalty tax on employers in non-compliant states unconstitutionally coerced
states to accede to federal system, but acknowledging that it provided states with “motive” to
accept). That political economy insight was almost certainly in the minds of the UI program
designers. See EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 128
(1963) (reporting Pres. Roosevelt’s explanation that the tax structure would encourage states
to enact their own unemployment insurance systems).
214. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 197–202 (measuring mobility of firms in response to
local tax rates).
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present bias of their electorate or local officials, both of whom are important
sources of political support.215 If anything, Congress is more likely to be presentbiased with respect to an RDF than local officials: by delivering an RDF payout, a
member can claim immediate political rewards, but she has no control over future
RDF funds and so likely places little value on them.216 And nationwide fiscal
stability is a public good, so no individual member has incentives to account
significantly for it.217 Congress can in turn influence federal agencies through
oversight and confirmation hearings, budget-setting, and other similar tools.218
In these respects, the problem of congressional oversight of state budgets closely
resembles the political economy of congressional management of national fiscal
and monetary policy. As is well known, the design of the Federal Reserve system
responds to the potential present-bias of Congress by putting much of the detail of
macroeconomic policy in the hands of bureaucrats with long terms in office and
self-sustaining budgets.219 This political insulation frees bureaucrats to pursue their
institutional mission over a long time horizon.220 A simple solution to the presentbias problem in RDF management, then, might be to simply assign the task of
disbursing money to the Federal Reserve.
As critics of the Fed point out, though, political insulation also has its costs.221
Obviously, insulation is likely to reduce an agency’s information about popular

215. On the influence of constituent preferences on official behavior, see, e.g., Alan D.
Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980–1993, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 6, 7–25 (1998);
Benjamin J. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effect of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POLI.
SCI. REV. 175, 176–90 (1983). For discussion of the state-official influence question, see
Brian Galle, The Politics of Federalism: Self-Interest or Safeguards? Evidence from
Congressional Control of State Taxation 5–7 (Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759510.
216. Cf. Gyung-Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller & Andrew C. Sobel, Political Compromise and
Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 25 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 472, 477 (2009) (“The political agent . . . may actually prefer less economic growth
and an assured reelection to better economic prospects and loss of power.”).
217. Cf. Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle & Christopher Johnsen, The Political
Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL.
ECON. 642, 656 (1981) (arguing that budgetary impact of individual spending decisions is an
externality for each individual legislator).
218. Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public Choice and Public Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 336–38 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243,
246 (1987).
219. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The
Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 613–14 (2010). For an argument
that this outcome was something of a happy accident, see Jeong et al., supra note 225, at
478–94.
220. Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 151, 151–62 (1993).
221. See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t),
99 GEO. L.J. 257, 307 (2011) (noting claims of skeptics that Fed is unaccountable to public);
see also Besley & Case, Policy Choice, supra note 200, at 52.
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preferences; only the most motivated groups will actively reach out to agency
personnel.222 As we have explained, optimal state savings would in part reflect
local preferences for spending and risk, meaning that if the Fed has inaccurate
information some states might actually be compelled to save more than would be
optimal, even taking externalities into account.223 In contrast, the IRA model at
least allows states to decide when the local benefits of withdrawal might exceed
any penalty amount, offering an avenue for the input of local preferences.
A federal-control option might also be more costly than others. One reason
voters and officials may be reluctant to contribute to RDFs is because they fear
they will be unable to access the funds when they want or need them.224 A stringent
RDF withdrawal mechanism might then require a larger incentive payment to states
to induce them to contribute in the first place. On the other hand, it is also
theoretically possible that federal control could lower costs by convincing voters
that their savings will not be wasted by a subsequent coalition.
D. Federal Enforcement of State Plans
Yet a third possibility could be modeled on existing methods for regulating
clean air and water. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act allow states to develop
their own plans for meeting certain pollution-reducing targets.225 The federal EPA
must approve plans, and states that fail to submit a satisfactory plan are subject to
direct regulation by EPA.226
The existing literature thoroughly explores the costs and benefits of the stateplan approach. By allowing states to take the first steps towards a federal goal, the
plan reveals some of the state-specific information held by local officials, and it
allows for innovation and flexibility based on that information.227 At the same time,
state officials gain somewhat more power to lobby their way around strict
application of the federal standards. Because the success of the program depends in
part on states’ contributions, the states gain some hold-up power over the federal
partner.228 The complexity of the cooperative system may also make citizen
participation more difficult and officials potentially less accountable.229

222. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future,
55 DUKE L.J. 943, 949–50, 965 (2006).
223. Given the degree of undersavings in the current system, though, it might be fair to
say, as our one of our mothers would have: “You should have that problem.”
224. Cf. Wagner & Sobel, supra note 63, at 183 (noting that officials may prefer weak
RDF rules because that arrangement increases their own autonomy).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
226. Id. § 7410(c), (c)(1).
227. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 617,
620–21 & n.188 (1995).
228. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1201–06 (1995); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing
Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 887 (2006) (noting that states can use
their control of information to game federal processes).
229. The Clean Air Act responds to this problem by making state inclusion of a wide
variety of perspectives a prerequisite for plan approval. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 190, at
433–34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7405(a)(2)).
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E. A Note on Triggers
For any of these options, policy makers will also have to choose how to decide
when RDF withdrawals should be permitted. In general, the choice is between
formulas and discretion: should money flow automatically when certain data
indicators reach pre-determined levels, or should officials decide when to disburse
funds? Our view is that, in this setting, formulae are preferable to administrative
discretion, but formulae of this kind are largely untested in the United States.
We think formulae are more promising in the abstract because of the importance
of timing to counter-cyclical spending. Discretionary outlays would better capture
all the nuances of a decision to release funds, such as the size of the current
recession relative to future possible recessions, the state’s spending needs and risk
preferences, and so on. But because of the very complexity of such decisions, and
U.S. law requirements for reasoned decisions in the administrative context, we
should not expect such decisions to be swift.230 Further, a lengthy deliberation
creates opportunities for rent seeking by federal officials who control or influence
the process, meaning that RDF determinations may be used as pork.231 These
scleroses of the money flow not only reduce its efficiency but also might jeopardize
its political sustainability, as the experience with the 2009 stimulus suggests.
In contrast, if funds are released according to formula, there is relatively less
opportunity for delay, hold-ups, or pork.232 For instance, RDF funds might be
released to a state when the state’s revenues have dropped by a significant
percentage from a sustainable baseline, or when per capita income or
unemployment fluctuates sharply.233 Some of these numbers could be gamed by
states, though, and others are collected only with some significant lag.234
Unemployment numbers are gathered pretty swiftly, and so are appealing for that
reason,235 but unemployment itself is a “lagging indicator” that only imperfectly
captures the status of a state economy.236 A recent Federal Reserve study proposed

230. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory
of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (1989).
231. See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout
Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 992–93 (1992) (making this point about government assistance to
failing firms). For a review of this phenomenon in major U.S. stimulus spending in the last
three decades, see Richard J. Mattoon, Vanessa Haleco-Meyer, & Taft Foster, Improving the
Impact of Federal Aid to the States, FED. RES. CHI. ECON. PERSP., 3Q/2010, at 66, 67–70.
232. Id. at 70.
233. Id.; Courtney Burke, Medicaid and State Budgets: Clearing Storm, Foggy Forecast,
11 (Nat’l Health Policy Forum, Issue Brief No. 824, 2007).
234. See Robert C. Vogel & Robert P. Trost, The Response of State Government Receipts
to Economic Fluctuations and the Allocation of Counter-Cyclical Revenue Sharing Grants,
61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 389, 399 (1979) (noting that some triggers give states incentives to
manipulate their tax base); Teresa Ter-Minassian, Decentralization and Macroeconomic
Management 11 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/97/155, 1997).
235. Vic Miller & Andy Schneider, The Medicaid Matching Formula: Policy
Considerations and Options for Modification 29 (AARP Public Policy Institute, Working
Paper # 2004-09, 2004).
236. Mattoon et al., supra note 231, at 72.
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instead to use a synthetic measure combining a number of different state
features.237
Our worry with any kind of formulary trigger, whether unemployment or some
other, is that they are largely untested at the federal level for use in combating
recessions. State experience with formulary access to RDF funds suggests that
using formulas alone might not be flexible enough to deal with varying state
needs.238 Federal revenue sharing in the 1970s used an unemployment-rate trigger
but with a severely flawed design that makes generalizing from its results
difficult.239 There are only a handful of federal programs that use any kind of
automatic trigger now, and none of them are designed to function well as a countercyclical tool. Federal education dollars vary based on local spending figures and the
number of students living in poverty.240 The latter figure derives partly from the
U.S. Census, which even when supplemented with annual updates obviously
involves a huge lag time between actual poverty figures and increased federal
dollars.241 Medicaid funding is based on a complex formula that in part depends on
a three-year rolling average of a state’s percentage of households living in
poverty.242 It presents similar lag issues.243 Evidence suggests that Medicaid as
currently structured does little to smooth revenues across states.244
* * *
Overall, then, there is no easy answer to the design problems faced by RDF
supporters. Each option has strengths and weaknesses. Further empirical work, and
perhaps policy experimentation, is needed in order to help decide which trade-offs
are the most appealing.
CONCLUSION
Our goal here has been to offer a set of policy options to help address the
challenges of state budget stability over the business cycle. The analysis has
suggested that several alternative policy options deserve consideration as a means
of providing increased federal support for state budget stabilization funds. Of

237. Id. at 76.
238. See Mattoon, supra note 15, at 7–8.
239. Federal aid was targeted to states whose seasonally adjusted unemployment rate had
exceeded 6% two quarters earlier. The long lag time meant that aid was denied to states in
the throes of recessions in favor of states that had already recovered. Vogel & Trost, supra
note 243, at 389–90. Further, because the trigger was based on an absolute level of
unemployment, rather than a change from baseline, states that were actually growing relative
to their earlier trend could collect counter-cyclical payments. Mattoon et al., supra note 23,
at 68.
240. Wilbert van der Klaauw, Breaking the Link Between Poverty and Low Student
Achievement: An Evaluation of Title I, 142 J. ECONOMETRICS 731, 733 (2008).
241. Gordon, supra note 151, at 1777–78.
242. Miller & Schneider, supra note 235, at 8–9.
243. Burke, supra note 233, at 11.
244. Stark, supra note 61, at 991–94.
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course, a skeptical reader might reasonably question whether the federal
government has the political will to undertake any of the reforms we propose. We
claim no special insight into Congressional politics or the legislative process, but
we do note that rainy day funds expose no obvious partisan rifts. At one time or
another, RDFs have enjoyed the support of both parties. In our view, RDFs
represent a “good government” solution that should appeal across the ideological
spectrum. While an RDF does permit higher government spending during
recessions, a well-designed fund also reduces spending at other times. Excess funds
are channeled into savings for recession fighting, rather than being used to grow the
size of a government, which many conservative economists believe would be a
one-way trip.245
Whatever the U.S. political scene, our hope is that the analysis provided here
may also be useful in other federations. The European Union, like the United
States, has struggled during the recent recession with the problem of procyclical
budget crises in states that can no longer print their own money.246 We have
focused on U.S. institutions, but much of the analysis can be readily translated to
the European context. Divergent fiscal and labor policy preferences frustrate
consensus at the Europe-wide level over how to head off budget crashes,247 which
suggests to us that a community-wide policy that encourages subnational budget
stability would be a very useful option. Some recent commentators have suggested
creating a Europe-wide savings fund,248 but as we noted in our discussion of an
earlier U.S. RDF proposal, such a shared fund faces serious common-pool
problems.249 Thus, our suggestions here should be of interest to EU policy makers
as well.
In short, we think it vital, and politically plausible, at least to begin a
conversation about stabilizing subnational finances. We doubt that we have said all
that could be said on the subject. For example, we acknowledge that another
approach to the same topic might focus more on the possibility that the federal
government should seek to credibly promise not to assist states that find themselves
in need of bailouts, or perhaps might condition such assistance on the states’
adoption of a satisfactory rainy day fund. That is a subject for the future. In the

245. See Wolkoff, supra note 42, at 59 (explaining that mandatory savings rules remove
discretion from government-maximizing officials). On the argument that expansions of
government are self-sustaining, see GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE POWER
TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 163–68 (2006) [1980].
246. Zsolt Darvas, Fiscal Federalism in Crisis: Lessons for Europe from the U.S. 14–15
(Inst. of Econ., Discussion Paper No. MT-DP-2010/21, 2010), available at
http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1021.pdf.
247. Paul De Grauwe, Crisis in the Eurozone and How to Deal With It, CEPS Policy
Brief No. 204, at 3–4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1604453.
248. Daniel Gros & Thomas Mayer, Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund, CEPS Policy
Brief No. 202, at 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1615478.
249. Like Mattoon, Gros & Mayer propose to mitigate this problem by requiring larger
contributions by nations with riskier policies. Id. at 3.

644

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:599

meanwhile, we hope our work here will spark research and responses from lawyers,
economists, and policy makers alike.

